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INDUSTRY-INFLUENCED EVIDENCE:  
BIAS, CONFLICT, AND MANIPULATION  
IN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
Abstract: In 2008, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
fused to consider scientific studies that a litigant had funded. Despite this rejection, 
many courts have failed even to recognize the dangers of relying on such potential-
ly biased research. As a result, standards for the admission of scientific evidence 
have evolved without accounting for the risks posed by industry-influenced evi-
dence. This Note argues for meaningful admissibility reviews via mandatory dis-
closure of industry influence. In this context, the evidentiary fraud doctrine should 
guide applications of Frye v. United States and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court greenlit the patentability of life science 
research results1 and Congress began encouraging public-private research 
partnerships.2 Just over thirty years later, in 2013, private industry surpassed 
the federal government to become the leading funder of basic research in the 
United States.3 Within the next four years, private industry funding increased 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (expanding the scope of patentable 
subject matter by approving the patentability of a genetically engineered bacterium used to clear oil 
spills). Diamond spurred a dramatic increase in private agricultural research. Adanna Uwazurike, 
Note, Remaking Making: Integrating Self-Replicating Technologies with the Exhaustion Doctrine, 59 
B.C. L. REV. 389, 408 (2018). 
 2 Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980). The Bayh-Dole Act incentivizes 
public-private “technology transfer,” the commercialization of publicly funded discoveries. See Margo 
A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 
B.C. L. REV. 217, 219–20 (2006) (discussing university-to-industry technology transfer). Prior to the 
Bayh-Dole Act, intellectual property rights stemming from publicly funded research vested automati-
cally in the government. Jennifer A. Henderson & John J. Smith, Financial Conflict of Interest in 
Medical Research: Overview and Analysis of Federal and State Controls, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445, 
445 (2002). The Bayh-Dole Act gave private entities the right to patent their discoveries, even if those 
discoveries were publicly funded. Id. at 446. In the following years, the United States saw dramatic 
increases in public-private funding and collaboration, university-owned patents, and university-
licensed start-up companies. Id. From 1980 to 2000, industry funding of medical research grew from 
$1.5 billion to $22.4 billion. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-02-89, BIOMEDICAL RE-
SEARCH: HHS DIRECTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 6 (2001). In 
that period alone, more than 2,200 companies formed around university-licensed inventions. COUNCIL 
ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A GUIDE TO THE LAW AND IMPLEMENTING 
REGULATIONS 9 (1999). 
 3 Jeffrey Mervis, Data Check: U.S. Government Share of Basic Research Funding Falls Below 50%, 
SCI. MAG. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/03/data-check-us-government-share-
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to seventy percent of all research funding nationwide.4 Today, the federal gov-
ernment broadly supports industry-led research.5 Inherent in that private finan-
cial power is the potential to influence research.6 For the purposes of this Note, 
industry influence describes the corporate sponsorship of scientific research 
through monetary contributions, in-kind donations, or the designation of re-
search parameters.7 Industry influence also describes scientific studies that 
have been ghostwritten by someone with a personal stake in the results.8 In-
dustry influence has the potential to create bias at the pre-study, study, and 
post-study stages.9 
                                                                                                                           
basic-research-funding-falls-below-50 [https://perma.cc/GXA6-3P6Y]. The National Science Founda-
tion defines “basic research” as activity having no immediate commercial value. Id. By contrast, “ap-
plied research” has a “specific commercial objective.” Id. 
 4 MARK BOROUSH, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. & ENG’G STATISTICS, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: 
U.S. TRENDS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 7 (2020). 
 5 See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (modify-
ing patent law to favor the patent filer rather than the inventor); Federal Technology Transfer Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (enabling “cooperative research and development agree-
ments”); Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 
(requiring publicly funded laboratories to budget for and participate in technology transfers). 
 6 See Darren E. Zinner et al., Participation of Academic Scientists in Relationships with Industry, 
28 HEALTH AFF. 1814, 1814–15 (2009) (summarizing various types of university-industry relation-
ships and the roles that researchers play, such as consultant, equity owner, paid speaker, scientific 
advisory board member, and scientist under grant or contract); Mhairi Ransom, Note, Drugs & Mon-
ey: The Impact of Industry “Donated” Money on Public Research and the Need for Stricter Conflict 
of Interest Standards, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 567, 570–71 (2008) (discussing industry financial 
support and its effects on scientific discoveries). Industry-led research has made significant contribu-
tions to both law and science. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Hidden Experts: Judging Science After Daub-
ert, in TRYING TIMES: SCIENCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES AFTER DAUBERT 30, 39 (Vivian Weil ed., 
2001) (discussing National Research Council reports on DNA “fingerprint” evidence). Disputes over 
the reliability of DNA “fingerprinting” led the National Research Council to conduct intensive re-
search into DNA and issue two reports to guide its evidentiary use. See generally COMM. ON DNA 
FORENSIC SCI., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996); 
COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FO-
RENSIC SCIENCE (1992). 
 7 See Leslie I. Boden & David Ozonoff, Litigation-Generated Science: Why Should We Care?, 
116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 117, 118 (2008) (“Direct funding of a specific study by an interested 
party is not the only dimension of financial conflict of interest. Financial conflicts can be generated by 
funding of other studies, research-related gifts, board membership, and stock ownership.”); Ransom, 
supra note 6, at 570–71 (describing the “strings” attached to purportedly altruistic gifts from private 
industry to researchers). 
 8 Ghostwriting is the process of writing under the name of another. Ghostwriter, WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Philip B. Gove ed., 1986). Once published, ghostwritten 
studies bear an imprimatur of neutrality. See Sheldon Krimsky & Carey Gillam, Roundup Litigation 
Discovery Documents: Implications for Public Health and Journal Ethics, 39 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 
318, 320–21 (2018) (summarizing ghostwritten research uncovered in recent litigation). The Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania has described ghostwriting as “polluting the scientific literature.” Barton v. 
Wyeth Pharm., Inc., Nos. 694 EDA 2010, 695 EDA 2010, 2012 WL 112613, at *11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 3, 2012). 
 9 See generally Christopher J. Pannucci & Edwin G. Wilkins, Identifying and Avoiding Bias in 
Research, 126 J. PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 619 (2010). When a particular result would 
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Critics in the media have expressed concern over the effects of industry 
influence on clinical trials, expert testimony, government decision making, and 
scientific literature.10 This has spurred numerous books, congressional hear-
ings, editorials, investigations, and lawsuits advocating for scientific neutrali-
ty.11 For instance, when an investigative report by the Los Angeles Times dis-
covered that employees of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) were per-
sonally profiting from cooperative research and development agreements with 
private industry, the newspaper accused the NIH of corruption.12 
The U.S. Supreme Court has a long history of relying on empirical stud-
ies.13 In 2008, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Supreme Court addressed 
                                                                                                                           
benefit a study’s sponsor, researchers could consciously or subconsciously design a study to obtain 
that result (a pre-study design flaw), probe the data purposefully to find that result (a study observa-
tion bias), or publish only the studies or portions of studies that reached that result (a post-study publi-
cation bias). Id. at 619–25. The presence of industry influence poses risks that warrant scrutiny. See 
Sheldon Krimsky & L.S. Rothenberg, Financial Interest and Its Disclosure in Scientific Publications, 
280 JAMA 225, 225 (1998) (describing the potential for conflicts of interest in scientific research). It 
does not and should not automatically preclude the admission of industry-influenced evidence that is 
nevertheless reliable. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 1997 WL 230818, at *5–6 
(E.D. Pa. May 5, 1997) (alteration in original) (refusing to assume the “wors[t] case scenario” when 
evidence of biased science was merely conjectural). 
 10 See, e.g., Lisa Girion, J&J Kept a Guiding Hand on Talc Safety Research, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-cancer-research/jj-kept-a-guiding-hand-
on-talc-safety-research-idUSKBN1OD1SW [https://perma.cc/RS7R-LXWG] (reporting on efforts to 
influence researchers investigating talc for asbestos); Andrew Joseph, ‘We Owe Much to the Sackler 
Family’: How Gifts to a Top Medical School Advanced the Interests of Purdue Pharma, STAT (Apr. 9, 
2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/04/09/sackler-purdue-pharma-gifts-to-tufts-advanced-company-
interests [https://perma.cc/GZY3-Y4EL] (reporting on monetary and personnel contributions from a 
pharmaceutical corporation to a private university medical school); Natasha Singer, Medical Papers 
by Ghostwriters Pushed Therapy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/
health/research/05ghost.html [https://perma.cc/395U-J3WK] (reporting on twenty-six ghostwritten 
articles promoting the use of hormone therapies to prevent aging, heart disease, and dementia); Nata-
sha Singer, Senator Moves to Block Medical Ghostwriting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2009), https://www.
nytimes.com/2009/08/19/health/research/19ethics.html [https://perma.cc/7NHP-WPJ4] (reporting on a 
letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) concerning ghost-
writing). 
 11 Sheldon Krimsky, The Funding Effect in Science and Its Implications for the Judiciary, 13 J.L. 
& POL’Y 43, 45 (2005). 
 12 Editorial, Subverting U.S. Health, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2003), https://www.latimes.com/archives/
la-xpm-2003-dec-07-ed-nunih7-story.html [https://perma.cc/AA8U-9S53]. The Los Angeles Times 
concluded that the NIH, once perceived as scientifically neutral, had been tainted by industry influ-
ence. Id. The NIH is not the only governmental agency to feel the effects of industry influence. See 
Krimsky, supra note 11, at 62–63. An investigative report into eighteen expert advisory committees at 
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, a division of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 
found that at least one committee member had a financial stake in the drug under review more than 
90% of the time. Id. 
 13 Adam Liptak, From One Footnote, a Debate over the Tangles of Law, Science and Money, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/washington/25bar.html [https://
perma.cc/F9QG-FQW6]. In Muller v. Oregon, then-litigator and eventual U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Louis D. Brandeis filed a 113-page, primarily scientific brief about the effects of long working hours 
on women. The Brandeis Brief—in Its Entirety, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS SCH. L. LIBR., https://louisville.
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the risks of such reliance in a footnote.14 Following the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil 
spill in Prince William Sound, a jury in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Alaska awarded $287 million in compensatory damages and five billion dol-
lars in punitive damages, the greatest punitive damages award to date.15 Exxon 
appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit eventually re-
duced the punitive damages award to $2.5 billion in light of a recent Supreme 
Court decision on the constitutional limits of punitive-to-compensatory dam-
ages ratios.16 Exxon then challenged the reduced award and appealed the 
judgment to the Supreme Court.17 In an amicus brief filed in support of Exxon, 
the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) argued that the Supreme Court 
should further reduce the award because juries cannot be trusted to produce 
consistent and predictable punitive damages awards.18 In support, the amicus 
brief cited a book and empirical studies that were funded by Exxon and pub-
lished during the Baker litigation.19 Writing for the majority, Justice David H. 
Souter stated that the Supreme Court was aware of no research that contradict-
ed WLF’s argument.20 Justice Souter added a footnote to explain, however, 
                                                                                                                           
edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-d.-brandeis-collection/the-brandeis-brief-in-its-entirety 
[https://perma.cc/3ZVV-QTY9]. See generally Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). This winning 
brief has been memorialized as the “Brandeis Brief.” The Brandeis Brief—in Its Entirety, supra. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has not always been so amenable to this empirical strategy. See generally, e.g., 
McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (deeming two statistical analyses of racially disparate pun-
ishments in more than 2,000 capital cases insufficient to support a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 14 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 n.17 (2008). 
 15 In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 16 In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). In 2003, in State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that few punitive-to-compensatory 
damages ratios greater than ten-to-one are constitutionally permissible. 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). In 
Baker, taking for granted the district court’s calculations of the total compensatory damages, the puni-
tive-to-compensatory ratio was $5 billion to $507 million, or approximately five-to-one. 554 U.S. at 
515. 
 17 Baker, 554 U.S. at 490. 
 18 Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 23–27, 
Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (No. 07-219), 2007 WL 4618317, at *23–28. 
 19 Id.; see David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1139, 1139 (2000) (acknowledging funding from Exxon but maintaining that Exxon had no 
input in the analysis or conclusion); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence? 29 
J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 237 (2000) (same); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with 
Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2071 (1998) [hereinafter Sunstein et 
al., Assessing Punitive Damages] (same). Several large corporations filed an amicus brief in Campbell 
that cited to these same sources. Brief of Certain Leading Business Corporations as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No. 01-1289), 2002 WL 1964582, at *11 n.18, 
*12 n.22, *17 n.30; see Alan Zarembo, Funding Studies to Suit Need, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2003), https://
www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-dec-03-me-exxon3-story.html [https://perma.cc/9C8N-ZUM6] 
(reporting on the filing of Exxon-funded studies in Campbell and in Exxon’s appeals to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). 
 20 See Baker, 554 U.S. at 501 (“We are aware of no scholarly work pointing to consistency across 
punitive awards in cases involving similar claims and circumstances.”). 
2020] Bias, Conflict, and Manipulation in Scientific Evidence 2159 
that the Supreme Court would not rely on WLF’s sources because Exxon had 
funded them.21 Despite this unequivocal rejection, few courts have even rec-
ognized industry-influenced evidence, let alone excluded it.22 
This Note analyzes existing evidentiary practices and proposes an ap-
proach for modernizing them.23 Part I explains the relevant differences in scien-
tific and legal epistemology.24 Part II explores how narrowly applied admissibil-
ity standards have failed to account for industry influence.25 Part III studies one 
such application in a recent case regarding the carcinogenicity of an herbicide.26 
Part IV argues that courts should assess industry-influenced evidence for fraud 
and proposes a procedural overlay to facilitate this assessment.27 
I. DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC EPISTEMOLOGY PREVENT  
THE FORMULATION OF A PERFECT ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD 
Both law and science are guided by the truth.28 For the most part, their 
similarities end there.29 First and foremost, advocacy—not objectivity—is the 
currency of the law.30 There is no expectation that lawyers are neutral; in fact, 
lawyers have a professional duty to be biased in favor of their clients.31 When 
lawyers present facts, they do so with their client’s interests in mind.32 No one 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Id. at 501 n.17. (“The Court is aware of a body of literature running parallel to anecdotal re-
ports, examining the predictability of punitive awards by conducting numerous ‘mock juries,’ where 
different ‘jurors’ are confronted with the same hypothetical case. Because this research was funded in 
part by Exxon, we decline to rely on it.” (citations omitted)). But see Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leather-
man Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 n.5 (2001) (quoting with approval Sunstein et al., Assessing 
Punitive Damages, supra note 19, at 2074). See generally Shireen A. Barday, Note, Punitive Damag-
es, Remunerated Research, and the Legal Profession, 61 STAN. L. REV. 711 (2008) (tracing the ori-
gins and use of industry-influenced research in punitive damages litigation). 
 22 See infra notes 126–188 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 24–255 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 28–57 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 58–125 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 126–188 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 189–255 and accompanying text. 
 28 See Krimsky, supra note 11, at 46 (“It is fair to say that the judicial system and the scientific 
system are both about getting to the truth.”). 
 29 See Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 38 (stating that science and law approach truth in distinct ways). 
 30 See id. (recognizing that the adversary system relies on advocacy and not objective truth-
seeking). 
 31 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer must 
also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon 
the client’s behalf.”). But see id. r. 3.8(d) (requiring prosecutors to disclose to the defense all exculpa-
tory evidence and information); id. r. 2.4 (describing the duties of lawyers who do not represent clients 
in a matter but instead serve as “third-party neutrals,” such as arbitrators, mediators, and “in such 
other capacit[ies] as will enable the lawyer[s] to assist the parties to resolve the matter”). 
 32 See Krimsky, supra note 11, at 46 (stating that lawyers typically disclose harmful evidence 
only to challenge it). Though opposing lawyers may present identical facts and argue for contradictory 
conclusions, neither may knowingly misrepresent the facts nor proffer fraudulent evidence. See infra 
notes 192–208 and accompanying text (explaining the evidentiary fraud doctrine). 
2160 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2155 
would expect (or pay for) anything else.33 Scientists, on the other hand, are 
trained skeptics.34 They are expected to acknowledge openly the limitations of 
their data and the falsifiability of their hypotheses.35 In the scientific communi-
ty, failing to disclose unfavorable data may be a sanctionable offense.36 
Industry influence is well known among scientists.37 Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers often solicit scientists to conduct their research.38 For example, 
after a professor published data which showed greater benefits of two name-
brand drugs over their generic counterparts, Flint Laboratories, a pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturer, contacted the professor.39 Flint asked the professor to con-
duct a similar study on its name-brand drug.40 The professor agreed and signed 
a contract that prohibited her from sharing her results absent Flint’s written 
consent.41 In 1990, when the professor’s study showed that Flint’s drug was no 
more effective than its generic counterparts, she submitted the study for publi-
cation but Flint threatened to sue her for breach of contract.42 The professor 
subsequently withdrew her submission and did not publish it until 1997.43 In 
response to the publication, Flint faced class action lawsuits alleging violations 
of state and federal law.44 Flint subsequently agreed to pay consumers and in-
                                                                                                                           
 33 See Krimsky, supra note 11, at 46–47 (describing the public expectation that lawyers set forth 
narratives favorable to their clients). 
 34 See ROBERT K. MERTON, Science and the Social Order, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE 591, 601 (enlarged ed. 1968) (explaining that organized skepticism is the systematic 
questioning of authoritative, institutional, and routine procedures). 
 35 Krimsky, supra note 11, at 48. 
 36 Id. The False Claims Act forbids the presentation of false information to the federal govern-
ment, including research proposals, reports, and publications. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. ET AL., RESPON-
SIBLE SCIENCE: ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS 84 (1992). See generally 18 
U.S.C. § 1001 (2018) (prohibiting the filing of false statements to the federal government). The False 
Claims Act has been used to prosecute pharmaceutical firms and at least one scientist. NAT’L ACADS. 
OF SCI. ET AL., supra, at 84. The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act imposes civil penalties for the 
same conduct. 45 C.F.R. § 79.1 (2019). Congress broadly promotes objectivity in research and man-
dates disclosure of financial conflicts of interest. 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601–.607 (2019). See generally 
James T. O’Reilly, More Gold and More Fleece: Improving the Legal Sanctions Against Medical 
Research Fraud, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 393 (1990) (discussing legal sanctions for research fraud, includ-
ing administrative enforcement, civil penalties, and criminal prosecution). 
 37 See Krimsky, supra note 11, at 50 (stating that a publication restriction garnered international 
attention and sparked a discussion about industry-influenced research). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 48. 
 40 Id. at 49. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 49–50, 50 n.30. Flint allowed the professor to publish the study after Flint was accused of 
withholding unfavorable findings. In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 44 See In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d at 714 (“After the article’s publication, lawyers 
across the country began filing class action suits. They sought relief under a variety of state and feder-
al law theories, including antitrust, RICO, and state consumer-fraud statutes.”). RICO is an acronym 
for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. See generally Organized Crime Control 
2020] Bias, Conflict, and Manipulation in Scientific Evidence 2161 
surers more than $130 million to settle the litigation.45 Though the professor’s 
case sparked outcry, similar restrictive covenants on industry-sponsored re-
search are still commonplace in the pharmaceutical industry.46 
No standard for the admission of scientific evidence has yet reconciled 
fundamental differences in legal and scientific epistemology.47 The first differ-
ence is that the practice of science is ordinarily “disinterested,” or neutral with 
respect to observers’ desired outcomes.48 The practice of litigation, by contrast, 
typically focuses on arguing for a client’s preferred result.49 Second is a differ-
ence in goals: the goal of scientific inquiry is to advance science, whereas the 
goal of litigation is to construct a winning evidentiary record.50 The third dif-
ference concerns review of the results, which in science is left to knowledgea-
ble peers but in law is left to judges during admissibility reviews and juries 
during deliberations.51 Fourth is a difference in closure, which in science is 
revisable consensus but in law is a final judgment or mandate possibly subject 
to appeal.52 Fifth is a disparity in certainty, which exists in science when data 
are replicable, but which has no analog in law; the legal system regularly sees 
similar cases reach dissimilar results.53 Sixth is a variance in proof, which in 
science is statistical significance but in civil litigation is typically a preponder-
                                                                                                                           
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968 (2018)). 
 45 In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d at 715. 
 46 Krimsky, supra note 11, at 50. Some journals associated with the International Committee for 
Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) require authors to affirm that their sponsors did not control their 
data. Id. Arguing that restrictive covenants prevent legitimate scientific inquiry and subject the jour-
nals to potential misrepresentation, the lead editors of these journals refuse to review or publish spon-
sor-controlled studies. Frank Davidoff et al., Sponsorship, Authorship, and Accountability, 345 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 825, 825–26 (2001); see also Disclosure of Financial and Non-Financial Relationships 
and Activities, and Conflicts of Interest, INT’L COMMITTEE MED. J. EDITORS, http://www.icmje.org/
recommendations/browse/roles-and-responsibilities/author-responsibilities—conflicts-of-interest.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q5GS-TLDX] (describing disclosures required for publication in ICMJE journals). 
 47 Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Epistemology, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 8; see Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 7, at 120 (“As it is presented at 
trial, even normal science is integrated into an advocacy narrative and becomes unmoored from the 
discourse of science as practiced outside the litigation context.”); Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 38 (listing 
seven major differences between legal and scientific approaches to truth).  
 48 Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 37–38. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. Filling narrative gaps may make for good persuasion, but it may also diminish scientific 
accuracy. Id. 
 51 Id. at 37, 40. 
 52 Id. at 37, 41. 
 53 Id. at 37, 42; see, e.g., Erica Evans, Similar Crime, Different Punishment: Campus Rape Echoes 
Brock Turner Case, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pennsylvania-
sexual-assault-20160721-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/2A9Q-YZZ2] (comparing a six-year pris-
on sentence imposed for felony sexual assault on a college campus with a six-month prison sentence 
imposed for the same crime one month earlier). 
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ance of the evidence.54 The seventh and final reason that there may never be a 
perfect standard for the admission of scientific evidence is a difference in 
norms, which in science is a commitment to truth but in law is a commitment 
to justice.55 Despite these differences, admissibility standards have evolved to 
account for some of the growing complexities of the sciences.56 They have not 
yet evolved, however, to account for industry influence.57 
II. FRYE, DAUBERT I, AND DAUBERT II: HOW NARROWLY  
APPLIED ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS FAIL TO  
ACCOUNT FOR INDUSTRY INFLUENCE 
Section A of this Part explains how the general acceptance test—the pre-
vailing standard in many state courts—has permitted the admission of indus-
try-influenced evidence.58 Section B explores how the five “reliability” factors 
governing the admission of scientific evidence in federal court have failed to 
account for industry influence.59 Section C evaluates the utility of an influen-
tial sixth factor relevant to the admission of scientific evidence.60 
A. Frye: The General Acceptance Test 
In 1923, in Frye v. United States, the Court of Appeals of the District of 
Columbia rendered a two-page, citation-less decision rejecting the admissibil-
ity of the results of a systolic blood pressure test because the test had not 
gained sufficient recognition among the physiological and psychological 
communities.61 To admit scientific evidence under Frye, a court must find that 
the relevant scientific communities generally accept the evidence.62 Though 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 37, 42–43. 
 55 Id. at 37, 43. 
 56 See infra notes 58–125 and accompanying text (tracking the development of increasingly com-
plex standards for the admission of scientific evidence). 
 57 See infra notes 189–255 and accompanying text (arguing that industry influence is a matter of 
admissibility and proposing mandatory disclosure of industry influence to facilitate meaningful ad-
missibility reviews). 
 58 See infra notes 61–76 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 77–111 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 112–125 and accompanying text. 
 61 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Congress established the Court 
of Appeals of the District of Columbia in 1893. Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, 27 Stat. 434. In 1934, 
Congress re-designated the court the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Court of 
Appeals of the District of Columbia, 1893–1934, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/
court-appeals-district-columbia-1893-1934 [https://perma.cc/8MHR-F6X6]. Fourteen years later, Con-
gress changed the court’s name to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. 
 62 Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (“Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle 
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from 
a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must 
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
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simple at first glance, this “general acceptance test” has spawned more ques-
tions than it has answered.63 Scholars have lambasted Frye for being both un-
der- and over-inclusive of admissible evidence, but the decision has received 
less criticism for its overemphasis on scientific orthodoxy.64 
In 2000, in Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Jus-
tice Ronald D. Castille of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania based his dissent 
on the consequences of Frye’s overemphasis.65 In Blum, the plaintiffs claimed 
that Merrell Dow’s drug Bendectin had caused a birth defect in their child.66 
The trial judge admitted testimony from the plaintiffs’ expert, whose non-
epidemiological conclusions linking Bendectin to birth defects had contradict-
ed more than thirty published epidemiological studies.67 On appeal, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of Merrell Dow, holding that the 
testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert was inadmissible under Frye because the 
expert had used methods that were not generally accepted.68 
                                                                                                                           
longs.”). In Frye, the court conceded that it is difficult to trace the line between scientific theory and 
scientific truth. See id. (“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.”). 
 63 See generally, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1208–23 (1980) (exploring the ques-
tions left in Frye’s wake). In addition to delineating the “general acceptance test” that would govern 
the admission of scientific evidence for the following seventy years, Frye spurred a presumption 
against the admissibility of polygraph results. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 311 n.7 
(1998) (recognizing the uniform presumption against the admission of polygraph evidence in state and 
federal courts). For an introduction to the admission of scientific evidence before Frye, see generally 
David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, 
Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1799, 1803–05 (1994). 
 64 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 1145 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013) (criticiz-
ing the ambiguity of key phrases in Frye and the decision’s overall vagueness); Giannelli, supra note 
63, at 1208–23 (describing difficulties in the application of Frye); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New 
Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence—A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evi-
dence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 264–68 (1981) (summarizing criticisms of Frye). 
 65 See generally Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 6–17 (Pa. 2000) 
(Castille, J., dissenting). 
 66 Id. at 2–3 (majority opinion). 
 67 Id. at 4 n.5. Epidemiology is defined as “the field of public health and medicine that studies the 
incidence, distribution, and etiology of disease in human populations.” FED. JUDICIAL CTR. ET AL., 
Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 549, 551 (3d 
ed. 2011). 
 68 Blum, 764 A.2d at 4 n.5. The Blum majority cited other cases in which the testimony of the 
plaintiffs’ expert had been rejected, including one case where the expert had been deemed a “profes-
sional plaintiff’s witness.” Id.; see Lust ex rel. Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 
1996) (“Although [the expert] published the 1984 article prior to this litigation, he was at that time 
already a professional plaintiff’s witness. It is not unreasonable to presume that [the ex-
pert]’s opinion . . . was influenced by a litigation-driven financial incentive.”). In his dissent, Justice 
Ronald D. Castille asserted that Merrell Dow’s experts were “equally ‘professional defendant’s wit-
nesses’” because Merrell Dow had compensated them not only for their testimony but also for their 
favorable research, provided them with high-ranking positions at the company, and permitted them to 
base their conclusions on unreliable sources. Blum, 764 A.2d at 12–14 (Castille, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Castille dissented, asserting that the majority had overlooked the 
fact that Merrell Dow had created and distorted the supposedly neutral scien-
tific community.69 In support of this assertion, Justice Castille pointed to the 
plaintiffs’ evidence that, faced with a potential multi-million dollar loss, Mer-
rell Dow had employed its vast financial resources to manufacture studies for 
litigation purposes.70 Justice Castille adopted the trial court’s factual findings, 
which recognized that Merrell Dow had paid for and published scientific stud-
ies in peer-reviewed journals and had assigned as editors lawyers litigating 
those issues.71 
The effect of this industry-influenced orthodoxy was to preclude scientific 
evidence contrary to Merrell Dow’s pecuniary interests.72 In particular, Merrell 
Dow had created and supervised a “scientific subdiscipline” intended both to 
vindicate Bendectin and to suppress contrary findings.73 Justice Castille ex-
pressed concern over the ability to purchase scientific consensus and thus dic-
tate case outcomes.74 Nevertheless, Justice Castille felt constrained by the pre-
sumption that scientific consensus ends the Frye inquiry, and posited that ac-
commodating his concern required a specific exception to Frye.75 In the two 
decades since Blum, no such exception has gained traction.76 
B. Daubert I: The Rules of Reliability 
Enacted in 1975, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of 
expert testimony in federal court.77 In 1993, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Blum, 764 A.2d at 16 (Castille, J., dissenting) (“Merrell Dow’s role in virtually creating, 
and then slanting, the ‘scientific community’ should be a relevant factor in the Frye analysis.”). 
 70 Id. at 14. 
 71 Id. at 8. 
 72 Id. at 16. Justice Castille was troubled by the majority’s approval of the manufacture of slanted 
scientific orthodoxy and the subsequent ability to silence experts with differing views. See id. at 17 
(“Where the would-be relevant scientific community is a community beholden to the defendants’ 
litigation interests, that biased community should not be permitted to squelch dissenting opposing 
opinions.”). 
 73 Id. at 14. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See id. at 16–17 (contemplating “a limited exception to Frye that would permit the introduction 
of expert opinions contrary to those opinions generally held by the ‘scientific community,’ when those 
opinions are a result of proprietary research influenced by an interested party”). 
 76 See, e.g., Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 998 A.2d 962, 974–75 n.19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (recog-
nizing that the defendants had funded some of the studies offered into evidence, and that Justice Cas-
tille had admonished courts to scrutinize such evidence, but nevertheless applying Frye), rev’d on 
other grounds, 44 A.3d 27 (Pa. 2012). 
 77 See generally FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing for the admission of testimony by a “witness who 
is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” when the witness’s 
testimony “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” “is 
based on sufficient facts or data,” “is the product of reliable principles and methods,” and is based on 
a reliable application of “the principles and methods to the facts of the case”); see also Act of Jan. 2, 
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence). In enacting Federal 
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maceuticals, Inc. (Daubert I), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Rule 702 had 
superseded Frye.78 
The plaintiffs in Daubert I, like the plaintiffs in Blum, alleged that Merrell 
Dow’s drug Bendectin had caused a birth defect in their children.79 In re-
sponse, Merrell Dow filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an 
expert affidavit.80 In the affidavit, Merrell Dow’s expert stated that he had re-
viewed more than thirty published studies involving more than 130,000 pa-
tients, none of which had connected Bendectin to birth defects.81 Based on 
these data, the expert concluded that Bendectin did not cause the alleged birth 
defects.82 In response, the plaintiffs proffered eight experts who reached the 
opposite conclusion based on animal cell testing, live animal observation, 
chemical structure evaluation, and an unpublished reanalysis of epidemiologi-
cal studies.83 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California ruled that 
in light of the vast epidemiological data available, expert testimony based on 
any other type of data was inadmissible.84 The district court therefore rejected 
the plaintiffs’ animal and chemical evidence.85 The district court also rejected 
the plaintiffs’ unpublished reanalysis because although it was based on epide-
                                                                                                                           
Rule of Evidence 702, the Advisory Committee recognized that expert witness testimony may be 
necessary where “[a]n intelligent evaluation of facts is . . . difficult or impossible without the applica-
tion of some scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory com-
mittee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. 
 78 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert I), 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). See generally 
FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing for the qualification of expert testimony). In 1993, in Daubert I, the 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari “in light of sharp divisions among the courts regarding the 
proper standard for the admission of expert testimony.” 509 U.S. at 585. In Daubert I, the Supreme 
Court recognized that “[t]he merits of the Frye test have been much debated, and scholarship on its 
proper scope and application is legion.” Id. at 586. At issue in the case, however, was “the continuing 
authority of the [Frye] rule” after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. Id. at 587. 
Interpreting “the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as [it] would any statute,” the Su-
preme Court stated that the legislative history of Rule 702 “makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid 
general acceptance requirement would be at odds with the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules and their 
general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony.” Id. at 588 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). “Given the 
Rules’ permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not 
mention ‘general acceptance,’” the Supreme Court rejected “the assertion that the Rules somehow 
assimilated Frye.” Id. at 589. 
 79 Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 582; Blum, 764 A.2d at 2–3. 
 80 Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 582. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 583. A chemical structure evaluation is an examination of the “molecular architecture” of 
a compound. See Jonathan Brecher, Graphical Representation of Stereochemical Configuration, 78 
PURE & APPLIED CHEMISTRY 1897, 1900 (2006). 
 84 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d, 951 F.2d 
1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 85 Id. 
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miological data, the reanalysis had no support in published scientific litera-
ture.86 Discerning no triable issue, the district court granted Merrell Dow’s 
motion for summary judgment.87 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating that a method that deviates significantly from 
those used by authorities in the field is not generally accepted and is thus in-
admissible under Frye.88 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that 
scientific evidence must be both relevant and “reliable.”89 The Supreme Court 
interpreted Rule 702 as imposing a “gatekeeping” duty on federal judges to 
decide the admissibility of scientific evidence.90 The Supreme Court delineated 
five factors to guide applications of the Rule.91 Like the critics of Frye, critics 
of Daubert I find the decision both under- and over-inclusive of admissible 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 576. 
 88 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d, 509 U.S. 579 
(1993). 
 89 Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 589 (holding that under Rule 702, “the trial judge must ensure that any 
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable”). 
 90 Id. at 597; see FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments (“In Daub-
ert [I] the Court charged trial judges with the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreli-
able expert testimony . . . .”). Some scholars have suggested that this “gatekeeping” duty predates 
Daubert I. See Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Mer-
its on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 324 (2011) (“Judges have always been gate-
keepers, but their gatekeeping tasks have changed a good deal over time.”). The Daubert I Court rec-
ognized that the admissibility of expert testimony is a “preliminary question” under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 104(a). 509 U.S. at 592 (citing FED. R. EVID. 104(a)). The burden of proving such admissi-
bility is therefore a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 592 n.10 (“These matters should be es-
tablished by a preponderance of proof.” (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 
(1987)). 
 91 See Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 593–94 (“Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not pre-
sume to set out a definitive checklist or test. But some general observations are appropriate.”). The 
five Daubert I factors are whether the method has been tested; whether the method has been subjected 
to peer review and publication; the method’s known and potential rates of error; the maintenance of 
standards controlling the method; and whether the relevant scientific community generally accepts the 
method. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments (listing the five 
“specific factors explicated by the Daubert [I] Court”). Six years after deciding Daubert I, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the five Daubert I factors apply to “all expert testimony,” including that 
which is “based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999); see FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments 
(“[T]he Court in Kumho clarified that this gatekeeper function applies to all expert testimony, not just 
testimony based in science.”). 
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evidence.92 These critics, however, have largely overlooked the effect of 
Daubert I on the admission of industry-influenced evidence.93 
Although described as “flexible,”94 the Daubert I factors do not explicitly 
account for industry influence.95 The first factor asks whether the method has 
been tested.96 This factor assumes that whoever conducts the tests will report 
unbiased results, an assumption which scholars reject.97 The second factor pri-
oritizes peer review and publication.98 Scholars assert that this factor ignores 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See generally Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges 
on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001) (survey-
ing 400 judges about their understanding of the Daubert I factors); David H. Kaye, How Daubert and 
Its Progeny Have Failed Criminalistics Evidence and a Few Things the Judiciary Could Do About It, 
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1639 (2018) (arguing that applications of Daubert I have failed to regulate 
adequately the admission of scientific and pseudoscientific evidence). 
 93 See infra notes 95–111 and accompanying text. 
 94 See Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 594 (“The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexi-
ble one.”); FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments (explaining that the 
Daubert I factors are “neither exclusive nor dispositive”); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 
717, 742 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that district courts should apply the Daubert I factors “as well as any 
others that are relevant”). “Courts both before and after Daubert [I] have found other factors relevant 
in determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact.” 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments (collecting cases). 
 95 See Mark R. Patterson, Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert Testimony, 40 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1313, 1345–61 (1999) (“Notably absent from this list is any mention of the possible biases or 
conflicts of interest of the expert.”). Two federal appellate courts have delineated another factor that 
partially addresses the risks posed by industry influence. See Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 
1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014); Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 117 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1997). In 1997, in 
Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that in applying 
Rule 702, district courts should consider whether there are other, more qualified experts who are not 
principally employed by the proffering party or its competitors. 117 F.3d at 81. The Stagl court 
warned against allowing industry litigants to define their own duties of care and thus dictate case 
outcomes. Id. at 81 n.2. In 2014, in Adams v. Laboratory Corp. of America, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of a trial court that had effectively delegated its gate-
keeping function to private industry. 760 F.3d at 1334. The Adams court warned against permitting 
industry litigants to define the contours of admissibility and thus set unreachable standards of proof. 
Id. 
 96 Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 593 (“Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether 
a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be 
(and has been) tested.”). 
 97 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1355 (“Researchers also may have incentives to reach particu-
lar results in other contexts, though, as when their research is funded by a sponsor from whom the 
researcher might reasonably expect future support.”). 
 98 See Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 593–94 (“Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or 
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but one element of 
peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability, 
and in some instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published. Some 
propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But 
submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of ‘good science,’ in part be-
cause it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected. The fact of 
publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, 
consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an 
opinion is premised.” (citations omitted)). 
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the fact that peer reviewers may be just as vulnerable to industry influence.99 
The third factor focuses on quantitative reassurances,100 overlooking the poten-
tial for cherry-picking favorable data, scholars claim.101 The fourth factor relies 
on industry standards and controls,102 so scholars argue that this factor misses 
the fact that the industry might slant those metrics in its favor.103 The fifth and 
final factor incorporates the Frye general acceptance test.104 Scholars therefore 
repeat their concerns about Frye, emphasizing that the relevant scientific 
community may not be as disinterested as courts assume.105 
Scholars suggest that Federal Rule of Evidence 706, which provides for 
court-appointed expert witnesses, is not a sufficient prophylactic.106 In his con-
                                                                                                                           
 99 See Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., 921 F. Supp. 666, 674 (D. Nev. 1996) (scrutinizing 
the value of peer review after Daubert I). See generally Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process 
at the Heart of Science and Journals, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 178 (2006) (discussing the substantive 
and procedural risks of overreliance on peer review in scientific publishing); M. Sun, Peer Review Comes 
Under Peer Review, 244 SCI. 910 (1989) (same); Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor’s World; Errors 
Prompt Proposals to Improve ‘Peer Review’ at Science Journals, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 1989), https://
www.nytimes.com/1989/06/06/science/doctor-s-world-errors-prompt-proposals-improve-peer-review-
science-journals.html [https://perma.cc/4D3D-CD79] (same).  
 100 See Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 594 (“Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, 
the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error . . . .”). 
 101 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1350–51 (“To the extent that the defendant can choose to fund 
research that focuses only on satisfactory aspects of the product, therefore, it may be able to create a 
misleading record for the product.”). In another context, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist posited 
that the malleability of data ought to draw suspicion, borrowing a quotation often attributed to Benja-
min Disraeli, “[T]here are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics.” Procter & Gamble Mfg. 
Co. v. Fisher, 449 U.S. 1115, 1118 (1981) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 102 See Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 594 (“Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, 
the court ordinarily should consider . . . the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique’s operation.” (citations omitted)). 
 103 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1351 (“The defendant might fund studies that are relevant to 
the issue in the case, but that are designed to be unlikely to detect a problem, even if one exists.”). 
 104 See Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 594 (“Finally, ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the 
inquiry. A ‘reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a 
relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance with-
in that community.’ Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence 
admissible, and ‘a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the 
community’ may properly be viewed with skepticism.” (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985))). 
 105 See supra notes 61–76 and accompanying text. 
 106 See FED. R. EVID. 706; Krimsky, supra note 11, at 64 (“[I]t is worth questioning whether the 
standards for impartiality were as high for the selection of jurors as they were for the members of the 
expert panel.”); Patterson, supra note 95, at 1370 (“[N]o expert is truly unbiased . . . any biases of a 
court-appointed expert—who necessarily comes with the imprimatur of the court—will perhaps be 
more insidious.”). Courts often appoint experts “when the parties’ experts offer[] directly conflicting 
testimony on topics . . . beyond the comprehension of the court.” Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, 
Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific 
Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1010 (1994). “[I]t is not uncommon for two scientists to interpret the 
same study very differently.” Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 7, at 119. In this way, court-appointed 
experts may help to resolve “battles” between opposing experts. Cecil & Willging, supra, at 1010, 
1060. For other criticisms of Federal Rule of Evidence 706, see generally Sophia Cope, Comment, 
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currence in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, a decision holding that federal 
courts review evidentiary rulings under Rule 702 for abuse of discretion, Jus-
tice Stephen G. Breyer stated that applications of Rule 706 would facilitate 
applications of Rule 702.107 Court-appointed experts, however, might still rely 
on industry-influenced evidence whether or not they, the attorneys, or the 
judge are aware of that fact.108 At trial, for instance, a Rule 706 expert could 
offer testimony that is knowingly or unknowingly based on industry-
influenced research.109 A litigant seeking to exclude this testimony faces a 
steep uphill climb because the expert would have been either approved by the 
litigants or handpicked by the judge.110 Either way, the challenger confronts an 
imprimatur of neutrality that a court is unlikely to reverse.111 
C. Daubert II: Taking Aim at Hired Guns 
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, Daubert I returned to the very 
same three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.112 In 
1995, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert II), the Ninth 
Circuit stated that the responsibility of federal courts is to ascertain whether an 
expert’s methodology falls within a range of generally accepted methodolo-
gies.113 Interpreting Daubert I as setting out five non-exhaustive factors, the 
Ninth Circuit added a sixth: whether the expert formed their opinion in antici-
pation of litigation.114 The Ninth Circuit intended this factor to ensure that ex-
                                                                                                                           
Ripe for Revision: A Critique of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and the Use of Court-Appointed Ex-
perts, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 163 (2003–2004). 
 107 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 150 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Given this 
kind of offer of cooperative effort, from the scientific to the legal community, and given the various 
Rules-authorized methods for facilitating the courts’ task, it seems to me that Daubert’s gatekeeping 
requirement will not prove inordinately difficult to implement . . . .”).  
 108 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1369 (arguing that the only available experts for court ap-
pointment might have conflicts of interests). 
 109 See Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 595 (recognizing that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, the 
basis for an expert’s testimony need not be admissible on its own). 
 110 See FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (providing the methods of expert appointment); Patterson, supra 
note 95, at 1370 n.198 (“Indeed, courts sometimes intentionally avoid cross-examination of their ex-
perts.”). 
 111 Patterson, supra note 95, at 1370. 
 112 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 113 Id. at 1317. The Daubert II court suggested that methodologies “practiced by (at least) a rec-
ognized minority of scientists in the[] field” could fall within the range of generally accepted method-
ologies. Id. at 1319. 
 114 See id. at 1316–17 (“One very significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are pro-
posing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted 
independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of 
testifying.”); supra note 91 (listing the five Daubert I factors). This sixth factor has been influential in 
many circuits, where courts have adopted the Ninth Circuit’s holding that in the absence of independ-
ent research, an expert’s testimony is inadmissible unless the expert offers other evidence to establish 
that the testimony is based on reliable science. Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1317–18 (“If the proffered ex-
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pert testimony is based on disinterested science.115 The court explained that 
experts whose research predates the filing of a complaint are more trustworthy 
than experts whose research postdates a litigant’s promise of remuneration.116 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that pre-litigation research commits an expert to 
their work, thereby reducing the expert’s ability to tailor their testimony to a 
litigant’s interests.117 Therefore, the Daubert II court concluded, expert testi-
mony based on pre-litigation research is inherently more reliable than research 
conducted during or after litigation.118 
This sixth factor excludes the testimony of “hired gun” experts, those who 
have abandoned scientific neutrality in favor of the highest bidder.119 In the 
context of industry-influenced research, however, it is not necessarily true that 
pre-litigation studies are more disinterested than studies conducted during or 
after litigation.120 First, scholars maintain that pre-litigation science can be 
                                                                                                                           
pert testimony is not based on independent research, the party proffering it must come forward with 
other objective, verifiable evidence that the testimony is based on ‘scientifically valid principles.’” 
(quoting Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 597)); accord Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 
426, 435 (6th Cir. 2007); Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 687 (8th Cir. 2001). In these 
courts, plaintiffs who rely solely on a “hired gun” expert will not survive summary judgment. See 
Johnson, 484 F.3d at 435–36 (affirming summary judgment for the defendant where the plaintiff’s 
expert was a “quintessential expert for hire”). In 2007, in Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that most experts are neither “quintessentially” 
biased nor perfectly untainted by industry influence. Id. at 435 n.2. 
 115 See Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1317 (“That an expert testifies based on research he has conducted 
independent of the litigation provides important, objective proof that the research comports with the 
dictates of good science.”). 
 116 See id. (“For one thing, experts whose findings flow from existing research are less likely to 
have been biased toward a particular conclusion by the promise of remuneration . . . .”). 
 117 See id. (“[W]hen an expert prepares reports and findings before being hired as a witness, that 
record will limit the degree to which he can tailor his testimony to serve a party’s interests.”). 
 118 See id. (“That the testimony proffered by an expert is based directly on legitimate, preexisting 
research unrelated to the litigation provides the most persuasive basis for concluding that the opinions 
he expresses were ‘derived by the scientific method.’” (quoting Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 590). The 
Ninth Circuit went on to note that because so few experts will fit this mold for any given case, the 
ability to cherry-pick experts based on their findings will be naturally constrained. See id. (“[T]here is 
usually a limited number of scientists actively conducting research on the very subject that is germane 
to a particular case, which provides a natural constraint on parties’ ability to shop for experts who will 
come to the desired conclusion.”). 
 119 Hired Gun, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see David E. Bernstein, Expert Wit-
nesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 
454 n.13 (2008) (summarizing the role of hired guns in litigation). 
 120 See Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 34 (“[T]he assumption that science is more biased if it emerges 
from post-litigation than from pre-litigation research remains, at the very least, more doubtful than 
[Daubert II] suggested.”); Krimsky, supra note 11, at 61–62 (“[T]here is no evidence that pre-
litigation research is more dependable or objective than post-litigation research.”); Patterson, supra 
note 95, at 1322–23 (“[I]t is not clear that research conducted independent of litigation is more relia-
ble, as presented in court, than research conducted in connection with litigation.”). Scholars caution 
against this sort of black-and-white cognitive line-drawing, as comforting as it may be. See Jasanoff, 
supra note 6, at 34. One scholar thus harkens back to Frye’s ambiguities, asserting that the Ninth 
Circuit oversimplified what is actually a nuanced distinction based on complex socio-cultural negotia-
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equally susceptible to industry influence.121 In sub-disciplines with significant 
commercial potential, the pressure to generate research that benefits the sub-
discipline economically resembles the pressure to generate research that bene-
fits the sub-discipline legally.122 Second, scholars note that timing alone does 
not necessarily bias a study conducted during or after litigation.123 In an econ-
omy that rewards bringing new products to market, there are few incentives—
other than litigation—to conduct research after a product has been released to 
consumers.124 Scholars submit that Daubert II therefore underestimates the 
potential for bias in pre-litigation studies and overestimates the potential for 
bias in studies conducted during and after litigation.125 
III. MONSANTO, THE GHOSTWRITER:  
A CASE STUDY IN INDUSTRY INFLUENCE 
Narrow applications of Frye v. United States, Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert I), and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. (Daubert II) have led to a default assumption that industry influence 
is a matter of weight and not admissibility.126 On this assumption, the few 
courts that have recognized industry influence have admitted the evidence sub-
ject only to cross-examination and the presentation of other evidence that pur-
ports to expose the influence.127 These techniques fall short of adequate protec-
tion against the risks of industry influence.128 
                                                                                                                           
tions. See id. (“In any legal proceeding involving scientific and technical evidence, it is far from self-
evident where (if at all) the space of law ends and the space of science begins.”). 
 121 Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 38. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id.; Krimsky, supra note 11, at 62 (arguing that distinctions based on publication timing are 
not as important as any underlying conflicts of interests). 
 124 See Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 38 (“[I]n a scientific-industrial system geared toward putting 
new products on the market, the research base for assessing postmarket consequences may not preex-
ist litigation in any meaningful way; not until litigation develops will researchers identify many issues 
worth investigating, and there is nothing inherently illegitimate about such motivation.”). But see 
Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 7, at 119 (recognizing that an industry could sponsor research as part of 
a product marketing campaign). 
 125 See Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 38 (arguing that the Daubert II presumption against post-
litigation research is inherently problematic). 
 126 See id. at 42 (stating that industry influence is a matter of uncertainty and analyzing it as a 
matter of weight rather than admissibility); see also Patterson, supra note 95, at 1352 (discussing the 
“incorrect result” of an application of Daubert I). See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 
(Daubert I), 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311 
(9th Cir. 1995); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 127 See, e.g., Kammerer v. Wyeth, No. 8:04CV196, 2012 WL 13033732, at *1 (D. Neb. Jan. 31, 
2012) (denying the defendant’s motion to preclude reference to the defendant’s ghostwritten studies in 
the evidentiary record); In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & PMF Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-CV-10012-DRH, 2011 WL 6740391, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2011) (same); 
Torkie-Tork v. Wyeth, No. 1:04CV945, 2010 WL 11431846, at *2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2010) (same); In 
re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06MD1769-ORL-22DAB, 2009 WL 223140, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. 
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The default remedy for witness bias is cross-examination.129 Cross-
examination may be sufficient to expose the bias of hired gun experts,130 but 
industry influence presents a special problem and deserves special treat-
ment.131 First, juries will likely find it difficult to appreciate the significance of 
unreliable research if the well-credentialed, so-called “expert” witness seems 
otherwise credible.132 Second, many expert witnesses may not know the extent 
of industry influence on the research undergirding their conclusions.133 In this 
                                                                                                                           
Jan. 30) (same), aff’d, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (M.D. Fla. 2009). Under Daubert I, “[v]igorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the 
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” 509 U.S. at 596. 
 128 See infra notes 129–188 and accompanying text. 
 129 Patterson, supra note 95, at 1320. In 1984, in United States v. Abel, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not expressly contemplate impeachment on the 
basis of bias, the Rules also do not preclude it. 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984). Impeachment is appropriate 
for experts as well as fact witnesses. See United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 328–29 (1992) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (stating that although cross-examination may not be a panacea, it remains the 
primary means of discrediting a witness); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 415 (1986) (recognizing 
that “[c]ross-examination . . . is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the dis-
covery of truth” (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (James H. 
Chadbourn rev. 1974))). 
 130 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1320 (“Courts generally handle biases of expert witnesses in 
the same way they handle biases of fact witnesses, by permitting cross-examination about the biases 
and allowing the fact finder to assess the overall credibility of the witnesses.”). 
 131 See id. at 1364, 1367 (arguing that conflicts of interest are particularly hard to ferret out on 
cross-examination and that such “bias might appropriately factor into an admissibility decision”). But 
see Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 7, at 121 (“With their own experts as consultants, attorneys have 
become adept at deconstructing the research and arguments of opposing experts. They also can point 
out to the jury when research presented by an expert has been funded by and controlled by a party to 
the litigation.”). Scholars suggest that such special treatment has an explicit basis in Daubert I. See 
Patterson, supra note 95, at 1320 (“It is, of course, exactly that sort of distinct treatment of scientific 
expert testimony that the Supreme Court established in Daubert [I] when it wrote that, in regard to 
such testimony, ‘evidentiary reliability will be based on scientific validity.’” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 590–91 n.9)). 
 132 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments (“The use of the term 
‘expert’ in the Rule does not, however, mean that a jury should actually be informed that a qualified 
witness is testifying as an ‘expert.’ Indeed, there is much to be said for a practice that prohibits the use 
of the term ‘expert’ by both the parties and the court at trial. Such a practice ‘ensures that trial courts 
do not inadvertently put their stamp of authority’ on a witness’s opinion, and protects against the ju-
ry’s being ‘overwhelmed by the so-called “experts.”’” (quoting Charles R. Richey, Proposals to Elim-
inate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word “Expert” Under the Federal Rules Evidence in 
Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537, 559 (1994))); see also Patterson, supra note 95, at 
1368, 1368 n.190 (recognizing that the credibility of expert testimony depends on the expert’s profes-
sional credentials and experiences); id. at 1375 (“Cross-examination in this context is not likely to be 
entirely effective because lay fact finders are likely to find it difficult to assess the significance of 
conflicts in research.”). But see Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 7, at 121 (recognizing that although 
jurors might find the relevant science to be complex, “most understand conflicts of interest and can 
judge the science presented to them with that in mind” during cross-examination). 
 133 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1345 (“Even if a litigant’s selection of an expert was unbiased 
and the expert himself had no conflict, the expert’s testimony might still be biased. This is possible 
because the scientific knowledge about which the expert testifies may itself be biased.”). Scholars 
argue that one way this might occur is when an industry distorts scientific consensus by controlling 
2020] Bias, Conflict, and Manipulation in Scientific Evidence 2173 
situation, cross-examination will likely prove ineffective because there is no 
way to elicit the damaging information.134 Finally, it may not be clear when or 
to what extent an expert witness has relied on a particular study or series of 
studies.135 Expert witnesses may testify based on their experience without rely-
ing on a specific study.136 In this way, an expert’s background familiarity with 
industry-influenced research could taint the expert’s testimony.137 In any event, 
a judge is likely to terminate this line of cross-examination if it delves too 
deeply into research that the witness did not personally conduct.138 
The presentation of other evidence that purports to expose the industry in-
fluence is similarly inadequate.139 In In re Roundup Products Liability Litiga-
tion (Monsanto MDL), a multidistrict jury trial in the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California, the plaintiffs alleged that Roundup, a popu-
lar glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto Company, had 
caused their non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.140 The plaintiff in the bellwether case 
                                                                                                                           
the publication of research results. Id.; see, e.g., supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text (discussing 
a restrictive covenant that governed the publication of an industry-funded study). Another way that an 
expert might not realize the extent of industry influence on their testimony is when an industry distorts 
scientific consensus by funding only studies that focus on the positive aspects of a product. Patterson, 
supra note 95, at 1345, 1351; see, e.g., infra notes 139–188 and accompanying text (discussing studies 
that an industry member funded, ghostwrote, and relied upon when sued). 
 134 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1375 (arguing that cross-examination is “even more ineffec-
tive when the witness did not conduct the research and therefore may not be able to respond to ques-
tions about it”). A survey of North American medical journal editors discovered that, prior to publica-
tion, only 28% of medical journals required authors to disclose their institutional affiliations, 26% 
required a list of funding sources, 13% required a list of past and present consultancy positions, and 
just 10% required disclosure of stock ownership. Krimsky & Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 226. Editors 
are required to disclose their conflicts of interest in less than 40% of all original research journals. Xavier 
Bosch et al., Financial, Nonfinancial and Editors’ Conflicts of Interest in High‐Impact Biomedical Jour-
nals, 43 EUR. J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATIONS 660, 660 (2013). 
 135 See FED. R. EVID. 705 (permitting an expert to state and explain an opinion without first de-
scribing foundational facts or data). 
 136 See FED. R. EVID. 703 (permitting an expert to testify based on supplied facts or data which 
the expert observed personally). 
 137 See Pannucci & Wilkins, supra note 9, at 619–24 (discussing the insidious nature of pre-study, 
study, and post-study biases). 
 138 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1364 (recognizing the hesitancy of trial judges to allow sub-
stantial probing of research conducted by someone other than the testifying witness). But see FED. R. 
EVID. 602 (providing that expert testimony may be admissible even if it is not based on “personal 
knowledge”). 
 139 See infra notes 140–188 and accompanying text. 
 140 See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig. (Monsanto MDL), MDL No. 2741, 214 F. Supp. 3d 
1346, 1347–48 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 4, 2016). Multidistrict litigation refers to the statutory consolidation of 
civil actions involving common questions of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2018). For an introduction to 
this unique process, see generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal 
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7 (1986) (explaining the need for multidistrict 
consolidation and the attendant problems). For an introduction to multidistrict litigation within state 
courts, see generally George T. Conway III, Note, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State 
Courts, 96 YALE L.J. 1099 (1987) (exploring the potential for the transference of federal multidistrict 
proceedings to state courts). Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma is a cancer of the lymphatic system. What Is 
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was seventy-year-old Edwin Hardeman, who had sprayed more than six thou-
sand gallons of Roundup over the course of twenty-six years.141 
Monsanto filed a motion to bifurcate the trial into a causation phase and a 
liability and damages phase.142 In opposing the motion, Hardeman argued that 
bifurcation would complicate rather than simplify the trial.143 In pertinent part, 
Hardeman argued that his evidence demonstrating Monsanto’s ghostwritten 
research was relevant to both causation and liability.144 On January 3, 2019, 
Judge Vince G. Chhabria granted Monsanto’s motion, bifurcating the trial into 
Phase 1 (causation) and Phase 2 (liability and damages).145 In Phase 1, the jury 
would decide only whether Roundup could cause non-Hodgkin’s lympho-
ma.146 If the jury found in Hardeman’s favor, the trial would proceed to Phase 2, 
where the jury would decide whether Roundup actually caused Hardeman’s non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma, and if so, to what extent Hardeman was entitled to recov-
                                                                                                                           
Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma?, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/cancer/non-hodgkin-
lymphoma/about/what-is-non-hodgkin-lymphoma.html [https://perma.cc/C7A5-DQTX]. 
 141 See Ross Todd, First Bellwether Trial in Roundup MDL Reaches End of Initial Science-Heavy 
Phase, THE RECORDER (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2019/03/12/first-bellwether-
trial-in-roundup-mdl-reaches-end-of-initial-science-heavy-phase [https://perma.cc/KU7A-TPBP] (sum-
marizing the facts and travel of Monsanto MDL). In cases involving many plaintiffs, courts sometimes 
begin with single-plaintiff bellwether trials to simplify the proceeding and provide a foundation for 
settlement of the remaining cases. Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
576, 577–78 (2008).  
 142 Monsanto Company’s Motion to Reverse Bifurcate the Group 1 Trials at 1, Monsanto MDL, 
MDL No. 2741, No. 3:16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018). Bifurcation is a procedural tool 
employed to streamline a case by dividing the proceedings into discrete phases. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
 143 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Issue Bifurcation at 15, Monsanto MDL, MDL No. 2741, No. 3:16-
md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2018). The Monsanto MDL court dismissed as a “relatively minor 
concern” the plaintiffs’ argument that “bifurcation is unfair because jurors will be left wondering, 
during the causation phase, how glyphosate could possibly be dangerous if it has gone largely unregu-
lated for decades.” Pretrial Order No. 61 Re: Bifurcation at 1, Monsanto MDL, MDL No. 2741, No. 
3:16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Bifurcation Order]. The court stated that the 
plaintiffs’ concern “is best addressed by an instruction to jurors that they must not defer to regulatory 
agencies, and must instead reach their own judgment based on the evidence presented at trial.” Id. 
 144 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Issue Bifurcation, supra note 143, at 10–15. The Monsanto MDL 
court agreed with the plaintiffs’ assertion that “[a]ny such evidence will likely overlap with evidence 
of liability” but disagreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that it would therefore be “impossible . . . to 
separate evidence of causation from evidence of liability.” Bifurcation Order, supra note 143, at 2. 
 145 See Bifurcation Order, supra note 143, at 1 (“A significant portion of the plaintiffs’ case in-
volves attacks on Monsanto for attempting to influence regulatory agencies and manipulate public 
opinion regarding glyphosate. These issues are relevant to punitive damages and some liability ques-
tions. But when it comes to whether glyphosate caused a plaintiff’s NHL, these issues are mostly a 
distraction, and a significant one at that.”). Judge Chhabria also ordered bifurcation of the subsequent 
bellwether trials, concluding that “this is the fairest way to proceed in a trial addressing the carcino-
genicity of glyphosate.” Id. at 2 n.1. 
 146 Id. at 1. When Hardeman’s counsel discussed Phase 2 issues in her Phase 1 opening statement, 
Judge Chhabria sanctioned her $500. Pre-Trial Order No. 91: Order Sanctioning Mr. Hardeman’s 
Counsel at 1–2, Monsanto MDL, MDL No. 2741, No. 3:16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019). 
Judge Chhabria ordered Hardeman’s counsel to disclose the names of every attorney who had partici-
pated even minimally in the preparation of the opening statement. Id. at 3. 
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er damages.147 Judge Chhabria excluded from Phase 1 all evidence of Monsan-
to’s influence on regulatory decisions, but left the proverbial Phase 1 door open 
to evidence concerning Monsanto’s influence on scientific studies.148 
                                                                                                                           
 147 Bifurcation Order, supra note 143, at 1. 
 148 See id. at 1–2 (“[I]f the plaintiffs have evidence that Monsanto manipulated the outcome of 
scientific studies, as opposed to agency decisions or public opinion regarding those studies, that evi-
dence may well be admissible at the causation phase.”). Hardeman sought to admit two categories of 
evidence concerning Monsanto’s influence on regulatory decisions. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Issue 
Bifurcation, supra note 143, at 10–15. First, Hardeman sought to expose Monsanto’s lobbying of the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to accord its review of glyphosate with those of Cana-
dian and European regulators. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel the Deposition of Jess Rowland, Monsan-
to MDL, MDL No. 2741, No. 3:16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2017), ECF No. 189-5 (“Goal: 
Persuade EPA to follow Europe and Canada in defending the science behind a determination that 
glyphosate is not carcinogenic . . . .”). See generally CAN. PEST MGMT. REGULATORY AGENCY, RE-
EVALUATION DECISION RVD2017-01, GLYPHOSATE (2017) (finding that there is insufficient evidence 
to establish a causal connection between glyphosate and cancer in humans); European Food Safety 
Authority, Conclusion on the Peer Review of the Pesticide Risk Assessment of the Active Substance 
Glyphosate, 13 EUR. FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY J. 4302 (2015) (same). In support, Hardeman pointed 
to the relationship between Monsanto employees and Jess Rowland, then-deputy division director at 
EPA. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel the Deposition of Jess Rowland, supra, at 1. In April 2015, Daniel 
Jenkins, U.S. Agency Lead at Monsanto, informed other Monsanto employees that Rowland called 
him to brag about his efforts to prevent a glyphosate review by the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry (ATSDR), a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. See id. 
at ECF No. 189-4 (“[H]e wanted to establish some saying ‘If I can kill this I should get a medal.’”). 
Jenkins concluded that Monsanto’s efforts to influence Rowland were finally bearing fruit, though he 
thought that ATSDR would still conduct its review. See id. (“[I]t’s good to know they are going to 
actually make the effort now to coordinate due to our pressing . . . .”). A few months later, Jenkins 
wrote another internal email about Rowland’s upcoming retirement, stating that Rowland could be 
useful in future glyphosate defense. See id. at ECF No. 189-6 (“Jess will be retiring from EPA in ~5–6 
[months] and could be useful as we move forward with ongoing glyphosate defense.”). Based on this 
evidence, Hardeman moved to exclude three EPA reports on the carcinogenicity of glyphosate from 
2016 and 2017. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion in Limine No. 5 to Exclude Certain U.S. EPA 
Documents Relating to Glyphosate Carcinogenicity at 4, Monsanto MDL, MDL No. 2741, No. 3:16-
md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2019). The Monsanto MDL court partially granted Hardeman’s 
motion, excluding the written reports from both Phases but allowing Monsanto to mention that EPA 
had approved the pesticide for consumer use. Pretrial Order No. 81: Ruling on Motions in Limine at 6, 
Monsanto MDL, MDL No. 2741, No. 3:16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2019) (“Particularly 
during Phase 1, discussion of EPA approval will be restricted under Rule 403 to avoid wasting time or 
misleading the jury, because the primary inquiry is what the scientific studies show, not what the EPA 
concluded they show.”). Relatedly, Monsanto filed a motion “to exclude evidence of the company’s 
lobbying activities,” which the court granted for Phase 1 but denied for Phase 2. Id. at 4 (citing FED. 
R. EVID. 401, 403). Second, Hardeman proffered evidence concerning Monsanto’s efforts to under-
mine a monograph by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), a division of the 
World Health Organization, which concluded that there is sufficient evidence to support a causal con-
nection between glyphosate and cancer in humans. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel the Deposition of 
Jess Rowland, supra, at ECF No. 189-4 (“As you know, we are considering the value/advisability of 
doing more work to help us deal with the IARC fallout . . . .”). According to a report submitted to the 
U.S. House of Representatives, Monsanto attempted to “undermine” the IARC monograph by orches-
trating “outrage” to it, “amplifying” its disagreement with it on social media, and attempting to “neu-
tralize” its effects with industry-influenced studies. MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON SCI., SPACE & 
TECH., 115TH CONG., SPINNING SCIENCE & SILENCING SCIENTISTS: A CASE STUDY IN HOW THE 
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE SCIENCE 5 (Comm. Print 2018). These industry-
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In response, Monsanto filed a motion to exclude evidence of ghostwriting 
as being both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, serving only to evoke an emo-
tional reaction from the jury.149 Monsanto asserted that such a reaction would 
be unwarranted because Monsanto had done no wrong.150 According to the 
company, the studies that Monsanto anticipated Hardeman would claim were 
ghostwritten actually acknowledged the company’s influence.151 Moreover, 
Monsanto averred that its involvement in the research process did not affect 
the empirical question of carcinogenicity.152 
Hardeman filed a response to Monsanto’s motion, disputing Monsanto’s 
relevancy and undue prejudice arguments and asserting that Monsanto em-
ployees had referred to ghostwritten studies as “invaluable assets” for “regula-
tory reviews” and “product defense.”153 He pointed to three of the studies that 
Monsanto had anticipated in its motion.154 
                                                                                                                           
influenced studies included five ghostwritten articles in Critical Reviews in Toxicology. See infra note 
154 and accompanying text. 
 149 Monsanto Company’s Notice of Motion and Motion in Limine No. 2 Re: “Ghostwriting” at 4, 
Monsanto MDL, MDL No. 2741, No. 3:16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Mon-
santo’s Ghostwriting Motion]. 
 150 Id. at 5. 
 151 See id. (“More broadly, the review articles at issue transparently reflect the extent of Monsan-
to’s involvement, which means they were not ghostwritten in any relevant sense.”); id. at 4 n.1 (listing 
studies that Monsanto anticipated Hardeman would allege were ghostwritten). 
 152 Id. at 4 (“[W]hether Monsanto ‘ghostwrote’ any of the review articles would not have changed 
any of the primary data . . . .”). 
 153 See Plaintiffs’ Response to MIL No. 2 Re: “Ghostwriting” at 2, Monsanto MDL, MDL No. 
2741, No. 3:16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Ghostwriting Re-
sponse] (“Monsanto’s own scientists acknowledge that they have ghostwritten papers that were ‘in-
valuable assets to regulatory reviews’ and for purposes of ‘product defense.’”). 
 154 Plaintiffs’ Ghostwriting Response, supra note 153, at 3–5; see Monsanto’s Ghostwriting Mo-
tion, supra note 149, at 4 n.1 (anticipating “‘ghostwriting’ allegations” about certain studies). In its 
motion, Monsanto acknowledged its involvement in one study examining the carcinogenic potential of 
glyphosate. Monsanto’s Ghostwriting Motion, supra note 149, at 4 n.1. See generally Helmut Greim 
et al., Evaluation of Carcinogenic Potential of the Herbicide Glyphosate, Drawing on Tumor Inci-
dence Data from Fourteen Chronic/Carcinogenicity Rodent Studies, 45 CRITICAL REVS. TOXICOLO-
GY 185 (2015) [hereinafter Evaluation of Carcinogenic Potential of the Herbicide Glyphosate]. That 
study’s four authors were listed as employed by Monsanto (David Saltmiras), retained by an inde-
pendent consulting group (Helmut Greim and Volker Mostert), or as a member of the Glyphosate 
Task Force (Christian Strupp). See Evaluation of Carcinogenic Potential of the Herbicide Glyphosate 
at 206; see also infra note 158 (describing the Glyphosate Task Force). At least seventy-six other 
studies have cited this study. Results, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?
hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Evaluation+of+Carcinogenic+Potential+of+the+Herbicide+Glyphosate
%2C+Drawing+on+Tumor+Incidence+Data+from+Fourteen+Chronic%2FCarcinogenicity+Rodent
+Studies&btnG= [https://perma.cc/7J2X-SH35]. Monsanto also acknowledged its involvement in five 
other studies published consecutively in Critical Reviews in Toxicology. Monsanto’s Ghostwriting 
Motion, supra note 149, at 4 n.1; see John Acquavella et al., Glyphosate Epidemiology Expert Panel 
Review: A Weight of Evidence Systematic Review of the Relationship Between Glyphosate Exposure 
and Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma or Multiple Myeloma, 46 CRITICAL REVS. TOXICOLOGY 28, 28–43 
(2016); David Brusick et al., Genotoxicity Expert Panel Review: Weight of Evidence Evaluation of the 
Genotoxicity of Glyphosate, Glyphosate-Based Formulations, and Aminomethylphosphonic Acid, 46 
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First, in November 2010, Monsanto employee Donna Farmer updated an 
author of a favorable study on Farmer’s ghostwriting progress.155 In an email, 
Farmer explained that she had finished writing the first forty-six pages of the 
study, added a section on genotoxicity, cut and pasted summaries from other 
favorable studies, and was drafting a response to a recent unfavorable study.156 
                                                                                                                           
CRITICAL REVS. TOXICOLOGY 56, 56–74 (2016); K.R. Solomon, Glyphosate in the General Popula-
tion and in Applicators: A Critical Review of Studies on Exposures, 46 CRITICAL REVS. TOXICOLOGY 
21, 21–27 (2016); Gary M. Williams et al., A Review of the Carcinogenic Potential of Glyphosate by 
Four Independent Expert Panels and Comparison to the IARC Assessment, 46 CRITICAL REVS. TOXI-
COLOGY 3, 3–20 (2016) [hereinafter Williams et al., IARC]; Gary M. Williams et al., Glyphosate 
Rodent Carcinogenicity Bioassay Expert Panel Review, 46 CRITICAL REVS. TOXICOLOGY 44, 44–55 
(2016) [hereinafter Williams et al., Rodent]. In response to these articles, the editor in chief and the 
publisher of Critical Reviews in Toxicology requested additional disclosures of Monsanto’s involve-
ment. Expression of Concern – 26 September 2018, 48 CRITICAL REVS. TOXICOLOGY 891, 891 
(2018). Two months later, the article authors released a corrigendum to make the disclosures. Corri-
gendum, 48 CRITICAL REVS. TOXICOLOGY 893, 893–94 (2018). In response, the editor in chief and 
publisher noted that the disclosures were “in some places in contradiction to the statements originally 
supplied” and that the journal had “not received an adequate explanation as to why the necessary level 
of transparency was not met on first submission . . . .” Expression of Concern – 30 November 2018, 
48 CRITICAL REVS. TOXICOLOGY 903, 903 (2018). The editor in chief and publisher “recom-
mend[ed] that readers take the additional context the corrected disclosures provide into account 
when reading the articles.” Id. Collectively, as of the publication of this Note, at least 172 studies 








WMHX] (finding thirty-three citations); Results of Solomon, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.
google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Glyphosate+in+the+General+Population+and+in+
Applicators%3A+A+Critical+Review+of+Studies+on+Exposures&btnG= [https://perma.cc/9LDW-
H32S] (finding thirty-one citations); Results of Williams et al., IARC, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://
scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=A+Review+of+the+Carcinogenic+Potential
+of+Glyphosate+by+Four+Independent+Expert+Panels+and+Comparison+to+the+IARC+Assess-
ment&btnG= [https://perma.cc/72JM-E5ZB] (finding fifty-six citations); Results of Williams et al., 
Rodent, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Glyph-
osate+Rodent+Carcinogenicity+Bioassay+Expert+Panel+Review&btnG= [https://perma.cc/DAN3-
W6FF] (finding twenty-three citations). 
 155 Plaintiffs’ Ghostwriting Response, supra note 153, at 4. See generally Amy L. Williams et al., 
Developmental and Reproductive Outcomes in Humans and Animals After Glyphosate Exposure: A 
Critical Analysis, 15 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 39 (2012) (finding that there is insufficient 
evidence to establish a causal connection between glyphosate and cancer in humans). Monsanto point-
ed out that the Williams et al. study discloses Monsanto’s support in an unnumbered footnote. Mon-
santo’s Ghostwriting Motion, supra note 149, at 5 (noting that the Williams et al. study “similarly 
acknowledges Monsanto ‘for funding and for providing its unpublished glyphosate and surfactant 
toxicity study reports’” (quoting Williams et al., supra, at 39)). 
 156 Plaintiffs’ Ghostwriting Response, supra note 153, at 4. Farmer referred to the unfavorable 
study as “gasiner,” likely a misspelling of Gasnier, the last name of an author who had recently re-
ported a strong causal connection between glyphosate and cancer in humans. Id. See generally Céline 
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When the favorable study was published, however, Farmer was not listed as an 
author.157 
Second, in July 2012, Monsanto employee David Saltmiras attempted to 
co-write a favorable study but was unable to counter contradictory studies, de-
spite drawing from the Glyphosate Task Force’s confidential research.158 Mon-
santo then decided that it could enhance the credibility of the study by replac-
ing Saltmiras’ name with that of a well-known expert, David Kirkland.159 
Monsanto paid Kirkland £14,000 to publish the study under his name.160 Salt-
miras was not listed as an author of the study.161 
Third, in February 2015, Monsanto employee William Heydens emailed 
Farmer, his coworker and coauthor on another favorable study, to inform her 
that hiring experts to contribute to the study would cost at least $250,000.162 To 
save money, Heydens suggested that he and Farmer ghostwrite certain sections 
and retain experts for other sections.163 Heydens then proposed paying certain 
                                                                                                                           
Gasnier et al., Glyphosate-Based Herbicides Are Toxic and Endocrine Disruptors in Human Cell Lines, 
262 TOXICOLOGY 184, 190 (2009) (“[Glyphosate]-based herbicides present DNA damages and [carcino-
gen, mutagen, and reprotoxic] effects on humans cells and in vivo.”). 
 157 Williams et al., supra note 155, at 39. At least 108 studies have cited the Williams et al. study. 
Results of Williams et al., GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=
0%2C22&q=Developmental+and+Reproductive+Outcomes+in+Humans+and+Animals+After+
Glyphosate+Exposure%3A+A+Critical+Analysis&btnG= [https://perma.cc/PR8U-6DXS]. 
 158 Plaintiffs’ Ghostwriting Response, supra note 153, at 4–5 (“[T]he Kier and Kirkland study 
was originally written by Monsanto’s David Saltmiras as a valuable resource in future product defense 
against claims that glyphosate is mutagenic or genotoxic.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See 
generally L.D. Kier & D.J. Kirkland, Review of Genotoxicity Studies of Glyphosate and Glyphosate-
based Formulations, 43 CRITICAL REVS. TOXICOLOGY 283 (2013) (finding that there is insufficient 
evidence to establish a causal connection between glyphosate and cancer in humans). Monsanto point-
ed out that the Kier and Kirkland study acknowledges David Saltmiras’s contributions. Monsanto’s 
Ghostwriting Motion, supra note 149, at 5. The Kier and Kirkland study also thanks Saltmiras “for his 
invaluable service in providing coordination with individual companies and the Glyphosate Task 
Force” and acknowledges that listed authors Larry Kier and David Kirkland “were paid consultants of 
the Glyphosate Task Force for the preparation of this review.” Kier & Kirkland, supra, at 311. The 
Glyphosate Task Force, now the Glyphosate Renewal Group, is an industry group aimed at renewing 
glyphosate registration in the European Union. What Is the Glyphosate Renewal Group?, GLYPHO-
SATE RENEWAL GROUP, https://www.glyphosate.eu/ [https://perma.cc/Q7GS-2T8N]. Monsanto’s 
parent company Bayer Agriculture is a member of the industry group. Id. Kier is a former Monsanto 
employee. Kier & Kirkland, supra, at 311. 
 159 Plaintiffs’ Ghostwriting Response, supra note 153, at 5. As one federal judge has suggested, a 
more forthright way to leverage the credibility of a well-known expert may be to list the real authors 
and have the expert draft a forward or summary endorsing the study. In re Yasmin & Yaz (Dro-
spirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & PMF Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 WL 6740391, at *9. 
 160 Plaintiffs’ Submission in Response to Pretrial Order No. 8 at 2, Monsanto MDL, MDL No. 
2741, No. 3:16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2017). 
 161 Kier & Kirkland, supra note 158, at 238. At least 81 studies have cited the Kier and Kirkland 
study. Results of Kier & Kirkland, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&
as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Review+of+Genotoxicity+Studies+of+Glyphosate+and+Glyphosate-based+
Formulations&btnG= [https://perma.cc/LT65-CVQ9]. 
 162 Plaintiffs’ Submission in Response to Pretrial Order No. 8, supra note 160, at 4. 
 163 Id. 
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well-known experts to publish the study under their names, just as Monsanto 
had done in an earlier study.164 Neither Heydens nor Farmer was listed as an 
author of the earlier study.165 
In his response, Hardeman also reminded the court that over a year earli-
er, Judge Chhabria had indicated the strong relevance of these three studies on 
the Phase 1 causation inquiry.166 At the time, Judge Chhabria pressed Monsan-
to on how its efforts to ghostwrite studies showing a lack of causation were 
irrelevant to the question of causation.167 Hardeman’s response relied primarily 
on a Superior Court of California case in which evidence of Monsanto’s 
ghostwriting was deemed sufficient to support a jury finding that Monsanto 
had sought to influence glyphosate research for litigation and public relations 
purposes.168 Hardeman also cited evidentiary rulings in four other federal cas-
es.169 As in Monsanto MDL, each of these rulings followed a defendant’s mo-
                                                                                                                           
 164 Id. at ECF No. 187-12 (“A less expensive/more palatable approach might be to involve experts 
only for the areas of contention . . . and we ghost-write the Exposure Tox & Genotox sections. An 
option would be to add Greim and Kier or Kirkland to have their names on the publication, but we 
would be keeping the cost down by us doing the writing and they would just edit & sign their names 
so to speak. Recall that is how we handled Williams Kroes & Munro, 2000.”). See generally Gary M. 
Williams et al., Safety Evaluation and Risk Assessment of the Herbicide Roundup and Its Active In-
gredient, Glyphosate, for Humans, 31 REGULATORY TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 117 (2000) 
[hereinafter Williams et al., Safety] (finding that there is insufficient evidence to establish a causal 
connection between glyphosate and cancer in humans). Monsanto pointed out that the Williams et al. 
study identifies William Heydens and Donna Farmer as contributors. Monsanto’s Ghostwriting Mo-
tion, supra note 149, at 5. 
 165 Williams et al., Safety, supra note 164, at 117. At least 832 studies have cited the Williams et 




 166 Plaintiffs’ Ghostwriting Response, supra note 153, at 2. 
 167 Id. In a hearing on August 24, 2017, Judge Chhabria was unequivocal about his position. Id. In 
pertinent part, Judge Chhabria stated that he was confused as to how Monsanto could contend, on the 
one hand, that scientific studies show no causal connection between glyphosate and cancer in humans, 
and on the other hand argue against the relevance of Monsanto’s ghostwriting those studies. See id. (“I 
don’t understand how you could have taken the position that the issue of Monsanto drafting reports 
for allegedly independent experts on whether glyphosate causes non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma could be 
irrelevant to the question of whether there’s evidence that glyphosate causes non-Hodgkin’s lympho-
ma. I just don’t understand how you could take that position.”). 
 168 Plaintiffs’ Ghostwriting Response, supra note 153, at 3. In 2018, in Johnson v. Monsanto Co., 
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, a school groundskeeper, awarding more than $289 million. 
No. CGC-15–550128, 2018 WL 4261442, at *6–7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2018). The Superior 
Court of California ultimately reduced the award to approximately $78 million. Johnson v. Monsanto 
Co., No. CGC-16–550128, 2018 WL 5246323, at *8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2018). 
 169 Plaintiffs’ Ghostwriting Response, supra note 153, at 2–3 (citing Kammerer, 2012 WL 
13033732; In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & PMF Prods. Liab. Litig., 
2011 WL 6740391; Torkie-Tork, 2010 WL 11431846; In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 2009 WL 
223140. 
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tion to exclude evidence of ghostwriting.170 In all four cases, the courts denied 
the defendants’ motions.171 Critically, however, neither Hardeman nor the 
plaintiffs in these cases challenged testimonial reliance on the ghostwritten 
studies, so the courts never addressed the issue.172 Hardeman’s only option was 
to discredit the evidentiary weight of the studies by attempting to show the 
extent of Monsanto’s influence on them.173 
Monsanto MDL exemplifies the consequences of narrow applications of 
admissibility standards.174 There, the court was bound to apply Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 as interpreted in Daubert I.175 As the Monsanto MDL court rec-
ognized, there is no such thing as a perfect scientific study.176 Daubert I ex-
cludes only those studies that are based on unreliable methods.177 In Monsanto 
                                                                                                                           
 170 Kammerer, 2012 WL 13033732, at *1; In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Prac-
tices & PMF Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 WL 6740391, at *9; Torkie-Tork, 2010 WL 11431846, at *2; In 
re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 2009 WL 223140, at *2–3. 
 171 Kammerer, 2012 WL 13033732, at *1; In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Prac-
tices & PMF Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 WL 6740391, at *9; Torkie-Tork, 2010 WL 11431846, at *2; In 
re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 2009 WL 223140, at *2–3. 
 172 See generally Kammerer, 2012 WL 13033732; In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., 
Sales Practices & PMF Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 WL 6740391; Torkie-Tork, 2010 WL 11431846; In 
re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 2009 WL 223140. On February 12, 2019, Judge Chhabria granted 
without a hearing Monsanto’s motion to exclude evidence of ghostwriting for Phase 1 and denied it 
for Phase 2. Pretrial Order No. 78: Guidance for the Parties Re: Motions in Limine at 2, Monsanto 
MDL, MDL No. 2741, No. 3:16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2019). Six days later, Judge 
Chhabria explained that he considered the evidence of ghostwriting essentially or completely irrele-
vant to causation but highly relevant to liability and damages. Pretrial Order No. 81: Ruling on Mo-
tions in Limine, supra note 148, at 1–2 (“This evidence is not relevant (or, at best, is marginally rele-
vant) to causation, so its admission during Phase 1 would be unduly prejudicial and would waste the 
jury’s time. During Phase 2, however, this evidence is far more relevant, and its admission would not be 
unduly prejudicial, particularly in light of the term’s use by Monsanto employees.”). 
 173 See supra notes 126–138 and accompanying text (describing the two most common protec-
tions against industry influence, cross-examination and the presentation of evidence purporting to 
expose the influence). On March 19, 2019, the Monsanto MDL jury returned a verdict in Hardeman’s 
favor in Phase 1, and the trial proceeded to Phase 2. See Mihir Zaveri, Monsanto Weedkiller Roundup 
Was ‘Substantial Factor’ in Causing Man’s Cancer, Jury Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/business/monsanto-roundup-cancer.html [https://perma.cc/DW5A-
WHMD] (summarizing Phase 1). On March 27, 2019, the jury returned a verdict in Hardeman’s favor in 
Phase 2, awarding him more than $5 million dollars in compensatory damages and $75 million in puni-
tive damages. See Pretrial Order No. 145: Judgment at 1, Monsanto MDL, MDL No. 2741, No. 3:16-md-
02741-VC (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2019) (entering judgment in Hardeman’s favor in the amount of 
$80,267,634.10). 
 174 See infra notes 175–188 and accompanying text. 
 175 See FED. R. EVID. 101(a) (“These rules apply to proceedings in United States courts.”). 
 176 Pre-Trial Order No. 45: Summary Judgment and Daubert Motions at 2, Monsanto MDL, MDL 
No. 2741, No. 3:16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2018) (“All the studies leave certain questions 
unanswered, and every study has its flaws.”). 
 177 Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 589. Case law supplies a gloss: epidemiological studies must account 
for confounding variables and potential biases. Pre-Trial Order No. 45: Summary Judgment and 
Daubert Motions, supra note 176, at 15. When they do, they may form the basis of an expert’s testi-
mony. Id. Confounding occurs when a factor unaccounted for helps to explain an apparent association. 
Id. Confounding skews the observed strength of associations and may produce false positive or false 
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MDL, the plaintiffs did not argue that the methods used in the ghostwritten 
studies were unreliable, but rather that the authors’ impartiality was questiona-
ble.178 Under a narrow application of Daubert I, however, impartiality does not 
matter.179 It makes no difference that the authors and peer reviewers of the 
ghostwritten studies—all members of the glyphosate industry—may have been 
biased.180 Their work remains a permissible basis for expert testimony despite 
the fact that they created the testing methods, peer reviewed and published the 
methods, calculated the methods’ rates of error, maintained the standards con-
trolling the methods, and comprised the relevant scientific community that had 
generally accepted the methods.181 Under Daubert I, these potential biases af-
fect the evidentiary weight of the expert testimony, not its admissibility.182 
The result would have been the same under the Frye general acceptance 
test.183 Under Frye, scientific evidence is inadmissible only when the relevant 
scientific communities do not generally accept it.184 Monsanto’s ghostwritten 
studies would have passed this test because each used industry-standard meth-
ods, such as live human studies, epidemiological observations, and animal test-
ing.185 Frye demands nothing more.186 As Justice Ronald D. Castille acknowl-
edged in dissent in Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
the Frye general acceptance test is not necessarily offended by the fact that a 
litigant is an influential member of the supposedly neutral scientific communi-
ty.187 Under a narrow application of Frye, industry influence does not render 
evidence inadmissible.188 
                                                                                                                           
negative results. Id. at 15–16 (citing KENNETH J. ROTHMAN ET AL., MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 129–34 
(3d ed. 2008)). Bias occurs when non-random error infects a study at the pre-study, study, or post-
study stage. Id. at 16. Judge Chhabria found that the studies undergirding the experts’ testimonies 
satisfied this standard. See id. at 29 (recognizing that the litigants’ epidemiological evidence was open 
to differing interpretations, none of which were “categorically unreliable”). 
 178 See generally Plaintiffs’ Ghostwriting Response, supra note 153 (arguing that the Monsanto 
MDL court should admit evidence of Monsanto’s efforts to influence research but not that the court 
should disallow expert testimony based on the influenced research). 
 179 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1319 (“Notably absent from [the Daubert I factors] is any 
mention of the possible biases or conflicts of interest of the expert.”). 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id.; see supra notes 77–111 and accompanying text (evaluating the Daubert I factors in the 
context of industry-influenced evidence). 
 182 Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 42; see supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text (discussing the 
prevailing view that industry influence is a matter of weight and not admissibility). 
 183 See supra notes 61–76 and accompanying text (assessing Frye in the context of industry-
influenced evidence). 
 184 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 185 See Pre-Trial Order No. 45: Summary Judgment and Daubert Motions, supra note 176, at 63–
67 (summarizing the testimonies of Monsanto’s experts). 
 186 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 187 Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 16 (Pa. 2000) (Castille, J., dis-
senting); see Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 7, at 119 (noting that in toxic tort litigation, “the vast ma-
jority of—or all—research on a product’s hazards may be conducted under the sponsorship of its 
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IV. THAT GOES TO WEIGHT: HOW CURRENT DOCTRINE PERMITS 
EVIDENTIARY FRAUD AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
Section A of this Part argues that a knowing presentation of industry-
influenced evidence may be fraud sufficient to justify relief from a final judg-
ment and that narrow applications of admissibility standards are therefore in-
compatible with the judicial duty to prevent evidentiary fraud.189 Section B sug-
gests a method of applying existing admissibility standards to evaluate the risks 
posed by industry-influenced evidence.190 Section C proposes a procedural over-
lay to facilitate meaningful admissibility reviews.191 
A. Evidentiary Fraud: A Matter of Judicial Integrity 
A lawyer’s knowing presentation of fraudulent or misrepresented evi-
dence can be so egregious that it justifies extraordinary relief from a final 
judgment.192 Such a presentation may violate ethical duties to the court, oppos-
ing counsel, and third parties.193 But the duty to avoid evidentiary fraud does 
not rest solely with attorneys.194 In 1944, in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that courts have an affirma-
tive, independent duty to guard against evidentiary fraud.195 In Hazel-Atlas 
Glass Co., the fraudulent proffer was an article that Hartford-Empire had 
ghostwritten in its favor and published in a trade journal.196 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
manufacturers or by researchers with industry ties”); supra notes 65–76 (summarizing Justice Ronald 
D. Castille’s dissent in Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.). 
 188 See Blum, 764 A.2d at 16–17 (Castille, J., dissenting) (contemplating a limited exception to 
Frye that would allow the admission of “unorthodox” expert testimony when “orthodox” science is 
industry influenced). 
 189 See infra notes 192–208 and accompanying text. 
 190 See infra notes 209–219 and accompanying text. 
 191 See infra notes 220–255 and accompanying text. 
 192 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3) (permitting relief from a final judgment when a litigant has 
engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct); Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118–
19 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining the evidentiary fraud doctrine). The evidentiary fraud standard is very 
demanding. See Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118. To obtain dismissal, the movant must establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that another party knowingly engaged in an “unconscionable scheme” that was 
intended to sway the trier improperly or to obstruct the presentation of a claim or defense unfairly. Id. 
 193 See generally David S. Caudill, Advocacy, Witnesses, and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge: 
Is There an Ethical Duty to Evaluate Your Expert’s Testimony?, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 341 (2003) (ex-
ploring the ethical questions arising out of the presentation of scientific evidence). As officers of the 
court, attorneys have duties of candor toward the tribunal, material truthfulness to others, good faith 
advocacy, and avoiding the presentation of false evidence. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (good faith advocacy); id. r. 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal); id. r. 3.4 
(presentation of false evidence); id. r. 4.1 (truthfulness to others). 
 194 See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944) (clarifying that 
courts share the responsibility of preventing evidentiary fraud). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 240–42. In 1926, Hartford-Empire Company decided to kick-start its stalled patent ap-
plication by publishing a ghostwritten article under the name of a widely known expert in the field. Id. 
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Court explained that evidentiary fraud injures not only the opposing party but 
also the judiciary, which cannot tolerate such attacks.197 In pertinent part, the 
Supreme Court stated that lower courts have a duty to question litigants’ mo-
tives to avoid falling victim to evidentiary fraud.198 Nevertheless, in presuming 
that industry influence does not bear on admissibility, courts neglect their Ha-
zel-Atlas Glass Co. duty.199 In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., a lawyer had ghostwrit-
ten an industry article under the name of a well-known authority in the field.200 
Similarly, in In re Roundup Products Liability Litigation, Monsanto employees 
had ghostwritten scientific studies under the names of well-known authorities 
in the field.201 The point is not that the knowing proffer of industry-influenced 
evidence is evidentiary fraud, but rather that courts are obliged to determine 
whether it is evidentiary fraud.202 
This is not to say that judicial scrutiny of industry-influenced evidence is 
a panacea.203 First, some industry-influenced evidence may be innocuous, so 
extra scrutiny might prove unnecessary.204 Second, scientific evidence can be 
complex, and opposing expert witnesses often espouse differing interpreta-
tions, neither of which may be fraudulent.205 Third, judges—like juries—have 
no independent knowledge of the science at issue; they must rely on the evi-
dence proffered by the litigants.206 Judges, however, have experience sorting—
                                                                                                                           
at 240. The article, which referred to Hartford-Empire’s design as a groundbreaking advance in the 
field, was subsequently published and attached to Hartford-Empire’s patent application. Id. The appli-
cation was granted less than two years later. Id. at 241. 
 197 Id. at 246. 
 198 Id. 
 199 See infra notes 200–208 and accompanying text. 
 200 Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 240–42. 
 201 See supra notes 155–165 and accompanying text (describing three allegedly ghostwritten 
studies in In re Roundup Products Liability Litigation). 
 202 See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 246 (forbidding judicial acquiescence where there 
exists the potential for evidentiary fraud). 
 203 See Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 7, at 121 (stating that “[d]isclosure is not a panacea” in 
scientific journalism because “[s]ponsors with control over publication” can still choose which studies 
to publish and which to leave unpublished, “thus biasing the overall literature”). 
 204 See Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 39 (“Litigation . . . can be a significant driver of high-quality 
scientific research and assessment . . . .”); Patterson, supra note 95, at 1378 (stating that under Daub-
ert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) courts may fail to recog-
nize the fact-specific issues or nonissues associated with industry influence). 
 205 See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 
1535, 1595 (1998) (recognizing that inexperienced jurors are expected to piece together a cogent reso-
lution of conflicting expert testimonies). 
 206 Id.; see Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 40 (“[J]udges review science in accordance with their per-
sonal understandings of scientific methodology. These may be informed by widely varied external 
sources, such as briefs by the litigants, briefs by amici curiae, representations by court-appointed 
experts or special masters, judicial precedents, and pretrial hearings.”). Amici briefs may pose a 
heightened risk of unreliability when their authors have an interest in the outcome of the litigation. 
See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 n.17 (2008) (refusing to rely on studies 
cited in amici briefs because a litigant had funded the studies). Reports by special masters may be 
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and, at least in jurisdictions where reliability is the touchstone of admissibility, 
are required to sort—“good” science from “bad” science.207 Rather than allow 
potentially fraudulent evidence to reach an impressionable jury, judges should 
evaluate the extent of industry influence in determining admissibility.208 
B. Applying Frye and Daubert I to Industry-Influenced Evidence 
It is possible to account for industry influence within existing admissibility 
standards.209 As an initial matter, such accounting must stay within the bounds 
of the applicable admissibility standard, whether Frye v. United States or 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert I).210 But judges have 
discretion in applying these standards.211 Their decisions will be reviewed, if at 
all, for abuse of that discretion.212 This is an ideal environment for moderniz-
ing Frye and Daubert I, both of which ask whether the relevant scientific 
community generally accepts the methods undergirding the proffered evi-
dence.213 Accounting for industry influence requires only one additional step: 
consider, upon motion, whether and to what extent an entity with interests sim-
ilar to one of the litigants influenced the scientific community’s decision to 
accept or reject the method.214 A variation on the evidentiary fraud doctrine 
                                                                                                                           
more reliable than proffered evidence, but they are rare. Gordon J. Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in 
Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 69–71 (1994). One scholar has analogized this 
relatively uniformed gatekeeping to the editorial process of scientific publications, although scientific 
editors usually have specialized expertise in the subject under review. Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 40. 
 207 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert I), 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (“This 
entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts 
in issue. We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review.”). But see 
Jasanoff, supra note 6, at 40 (arguing that the inferences that a judge draws from reliance on external 
sources “are filtered through the judge’s own, largely unreviewable sensibility concerning the reliabil-
ity of claims and claimants”). 
 208 See infra notes 209–219 and accompanying text (proposing a method of accounting for the 
risks of industry-influenced evidence within existing admissibility standards). 
 209 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1366–93 (proposing approaches to evaluating industry influ-
ence within admissibility standards). 
 210 See id. (explaining the processes by which Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
and Daubert I jurisdictions would assess industry influence as matters of admissibility). 
 211 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1997) (“[T]he question of admissibility of 
expert testimony is . . . reviewable under the abuse-of-discretion standard.”). 
 212 Id. 
 213 See Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 594–95 (“Finally, ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on 
the inquiry.”); Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (providing for the admission of scientific evidence that the rele-
vant scientific community generally accepts). 
 214 See Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting the improprie-
ty of allowing industry litigants to define the contours of admissibility); Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
117 F.3d 76, 81 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting the impropriety of allowing industry litigants to define 
reasonableness); Patterson, supra note 95, at 1366–93 (suggesting methods of scrutinizing industry 
influence as a question of admissibility). 
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should guide this inquiry.215 A court should exclude the evidence if the oppos-
ing party clearly and convincingly shows that the admission of the evidence 
would improperly interfere with the impartial adjudication of the case or un-
fairly obstruct the presentation of an opposing claim or defense.216 Unlike pro-
totypical evidentiary fraud, the attempted introduction of industry-influenced 
evidence might not be so unconscionable as to warrant dismissal of the case.217 
Instead, this inquiry is more moderate: industry influence is more than a matter 
of weight but less than a matter of dismissal.218 Still, an important question 
remains: how will a court know when to conduct this inquiry?219 
C. Mandatory Disclosure: Flagging Industry-Influenced  
Evidence for Meaningful Admissibility Reviews 
Mandatory disclosure of industry influence would trigger an admissibility 
review without creating a presumption about the outcome of the review.220 A 
system analogous to mandatory disclosure in litigation already exists in the 
scientific community.221 The federal government forbids financial conflicts of 
interest in research funded by or produced through cooperative agreements 
with the federal Public Health Service (PHS).222 Federal law requires each in-
stitution seeking PHS support to maintain a written conflict of interest poli-
cy.223 Every researcher must be aware of the policy and their responsibilities 
under it.224 Enforcement of this policy is internal, led by a designated reviewer 
who ensures that each researcher discloses all personal and familial financial 
interests that could impact the research, including salary, consulting fees, hon-
                                                                                                                           
 215 See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 246 (summarizing and applying the evidentiary fraud 
doctrine). 
 216 See Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118–19 (explaining the standard for the involuntary dismissal of a 
case in which a litigant has committed evidentiary fraud). 
 217 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (recognizing that not all industry-influenced evidence 
threatens judicial integrity). 
 218 See supra notes 192–208 and accompanying text (arguing that industry influence is too insidi-
ous to be handled by jurors). 
 219 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1361 (“[A]t a minimum, courts should require expert witness-
es to disclose conflicts of interest of the scientists who conducted the research about which 
they testify . . . . Only then will courts be able to assess the significance of the conflicts.”). 
 220 See id. at 1376–77 (proposing that courts order litigants to disclose all relevant research ef-
forts); see also Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 7, at 119 (arguing that because most studies are indus-
try-funded, automatic exclusion of these studies or a “rebuttable presumption” against their admissi-
bility “would have a disproportionately negative impact on plaintiffs by excluding much of the availa-
ble evidence,” at least some of which plaintiffs would need to prevail at trial). 
 221 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1340–45 (summarizing efforts to combat industry influence in 
scientific journalism). 
 222 42 C.F.R. § 50.602 (2019); see 42 U.S.C. § 289b-1 (2018) (requiring the identification, man-
agement, and elimination of financial conflicts of interest in public-private pharmaceutical research). 
 223 42 C.F.R. § 50.604(a). 
 224 Id. § 50.604(b). 
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oraria, stocks, stock options, and intellectual property rights.225 The institution 
must maintain records of these disclosures for three years following the date of 
publication, during which time PHS and the federal Department of Health and 
Human Services may conduct discretionary inspections.226 Though the institu-
tion must report the existence of a conflict to PHS and must manage, reduce, 
or eliminate such conflicts within sixty days of their discovery, the institution 
retains discretion over the sanctions (if any) to impose.227 The law further sug-
gests seven methods of managing conflicts.228 A special provision applies to 
institutions engaged in medical or pharmaceutical research: in that context, any 
conflicted researcher must attach a written disclosure to the research and 
acknowledge the conflict in every public presentation.229 
Many scientific journals impose even stricter conflict of interest rules.230 
In the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM), for example, every pub-
lished study must list the study’s sponsor, and no author may have a “signifi-
cant” financial conflict of interest.231 The Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA) goes further, requiring authors to disclose all “relevant” 
financial ties.232 NEJM and JAMA, along with the weekly scientific journals 
Nature and Science, consider the provision of expert testimony to be a conflict 
of interest.233 
In light of these regulatory and journalistic measures, similar require-
ments in litigation are reasonable.234 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
                                                                                                                           
 225 Id. §§ 50.603–.604. 
 226 Id. §§ 50.604–.607. 
 227 Id. § 50.605. 
 228 See id. § 50.605(a)(1) (suggesting disclosure to the general public, targeted disclosures, ap-
pointment of an independent monitor, modifications of the research plan, changes to personnel, reduc-
tion or elimination of the conflicted interests, and severance of the relationships underlying the con-
flict). 
 229 Id. § 50.606(c). 
 230 See Ransom, supra note 6, at 583 (stating that conflict of interest rules in scientific journalism 
differ greatly from the less restrictive federal regulatory standards). 
 231 See Editorial Policies, NEW ENG. J. MED., https://www.nejm.org/about-nejm/editorial-policies 
[https://perma.cc/MFS6-59RH] (“The Journal expects that authors of such articles have no significant 
financial interests in any biomedical company relevant to topics and products discussed in the subject 
they are reviewing or the article on which they are commenting.”); see also Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., 
Editorial, Financial Associations of Authors, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1901, 1901–02 (2002) (defining 
“significant” financial conflicts of interest). 
 232 See Howard Bauchner et al., Conflicts of Interests, Authors, and Journals, 320 JAMA 2315, 
2315 (2018) (“Authors are expected to provide detailed information about all relevant financial inter-
ests, activities, relationships, and affiliations . . . .”). 
 233 Bauchner et al., supra note 232, at 2315; Competing Interests, NATURE RES., https://www.
nature.com/authors/policies/competing.html [https://perma.cc/Q2N8-RQX4]; Editorial Policies, supra 
note 231; Science Journals: Editorial Policies, SCI., https://www.sciencemag.org/authors/science-
journals-editorial-policies [https://perma.cc/D8ET-GEQG].  
 234 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1375 (“At a minimum, scientific institutions require disclosure 
of potential conflicts, and a similar requirement would be reasonable in litigation.” (footnote omit-
ted)); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments (recognizing that 
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26(a)(2)(B) already requires litigants to exchange expert witness reports, 
which must describe the expert’s reasons and conclusions, bases in fact and 
data, and any supporting exhibits.235 One additional mandatory disclosure 
could be the extent of industry influence on the expert’s bases in fact and da-
ta.236 The following factors are illustrative but not exhaustive.237 For each 
study upon which an expert will rely, the proffering party would be obliged to 
disclose the following: the title of the study and its intended use at trial; the 
amount of financial assets (such as consulting fees, honoraria, intellectual 
property, salary, stock, and stock options) paid by the proffering party to the 
study’s authors, editors, or publisher; the nature of donations (such as capital, 
labor, and real estate) paid by the proffering party to the study’s authors, edi-
tors, or publisher; the existence of contracts (such as agreements, arrange-
ments, and consulting retainers) between the proffering party and the study’s 
authors, editors, or publisher; and the study’s funding sources.238 
This new burden would likely involve a review of the study’s acknowl-
edgements, attributions, and conflicts of interests sections, as well as some 
communication with the study’s authors, editors, or publisher.239 When a prof-
fering party is unable to supply this information, the party must describe its 
efforts to obtain it and explain why those efforts fell short—just as some scien-
                                                                                                                           
courts have already “shown considerable ingenuity and flexibility in considering challenges to expert 
testimony under Daubert [I]”). 
 235 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 
 236 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1376–77 (“The solution most likely to produce full infor-
mation would be to require that the sources of the in-house research disclose all of the research that 
they perform.”). In other contexts, scholars have suggested that industry influence could be tracked in 
a database. See Barday, supra note 21, at 732 (suggesting a database to track industry influence in 
legal scholarship). Scholars contemplate a database in which a user could search the name of an au-
thor or the title of an article to ascertain funding connections. Id. It is worth noting that the National 
Institutes of Health maintain RePORT, a funding source database for studies that receive federal 
funds. Research Portfolio Online Reporting Tools (RePORT), NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://
report.nih.gov/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/M4EW-BC79]. 
 237 See infra note 238 and accompanying text. If adopted verbatim, this list would not flag re-
search conducted by industry members other than the member making the disclosure; such research 
may remain just as likely to be proffered—and just as likely to be unreliable. See Patterson, supra note 
95, at 1377 (“If a party to litigation were to offer research sponsored by others—e.g., others in the 
same industry—some other approach would be necessary, because discovery would not necessarily 
reach non-parties.”). 
 238 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1375 (“[W]hen witnesses testify about research done by oth-
ers, courts should require them to disclose any conflicts of the scientists who performed the re-
search.”). In In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Alabama required the litigants routinely to disclose current research efforts 
relevant to the litigation. See id. at 1377 (discussing the court’s order in In re Silicone Gel Breast 
Implant Products Liability Litigation). 
 239 See supra notes 155–165 and accompanying text (describing three allegedly ghostwritten 
studies that acknowledged industry influence). 
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tists must certify the same under federal law.240 A party seeking to preclude 
expert testimony based on a disclosed study would bear the burden of proving 
that the study is unreliable.241 
Although mandatory disclosure may have the potential for discouraging 
industry-led research, that concern is based on two questionable assumptions 
about scientists’ hesitancy to disclose the extent of industry influence on their 
work.242 The first is that scientists fear damaging their reputations in the scien-
tific community.243 Although scientists are rightly concerned about their pro-
fessional reputations, the scientific community knows—even if the lay and 
legal communities largely do not—that most research involves industry influ-
ence to some extent.244 Mandatory disclosure would merely acknowledge that 
reality.245 The second assumption is that scientists do not want the disclosure 
of their industry connections to jeopardize the likelihood of being asked to 
give lucrative in-court testimony.246 This is a feature and not a bug of mandato-
ry disclosure.247 No one expects experts to testify without remuneration, so 
                                                                                                                           
 240 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1375 (“[I]nstances may exist in which witnesses will not have 
access to information about the conflicts of those about whose research they testify. In such cases, 
presumably the best a court could do is require . . . that the litigant provide a certification that it has 
acted with due diligence to obtain the information but was unable to do so and stating the reason.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 21 C.F.R. § 54.4(a), (c) (2019) (providing that the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration “may refuse to file any marketing application” that “relies in whole or 
in part on clinical studies” if the applicant does not disclose the prescribed information and does not 
certify that the applicant “acted with due diligence to obtain the information but was unable to do so 
and stating the reason”). 
 241 See supra notes 209–219 and accompanying text (setting forth a proposed standard for evalu-
ating industry-influenced evidence as a matter of admissibility). 
 242 See infra notes 243–255 and accompanying text (discussing arguments against mandatory 
disclosure of industry influence). 
 243 See generally Alexander Michael Petersen et al., Reputation and Impact in Academic Careers, 
111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15,316 (2014) (analyzing the import of a scientist’s reputation on their 
career prospects). 
 244 See Mervis, supra note 3 (describing the trend toward industry funding and away from gov-
ernment funding). 
 245 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1324 (“Editors select writers according to their reputation, 
academic performance, and independence. In truth, such criteria are vague and entirely subjective—
the skill, or bias, of the editor in making these selections is critical. Yet editors find it increasingly 
difficult to identify academic experts who have not crossed over to the commercial world in some 
way . . . . So, should the opinions of researchers who have collaborated with industry be disqualified 
from the pages of journals?” (quoting The Politics of Disclosure, 348 THE LANCET 627, 627 (1996))). 
 246 See, e.g., Douglas Starr, Expert Witness David Egilman Wins Billions—and Makes Enemies—
as He Fights Companies over Public Health, SCI. MAG. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/
news/2019/01/expert-witness-david-egilman-wins-billions-and-makes-enemies-he-fights-companies-
over [https://perma.cc/M489-AR53] (reporting on the positive financial consequences of one scien-
tist’s fight against industry influence). 
 247 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1327–33 (discussing the risks of “professional” and “hired 
gun” witnesses). 
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mandatory disclosure would simply flag some individuals and studies for a 
more sensitive review.248 
There are two other noteworthy drawbacks to mandatory disclosure.249 
First, an expert could be less than forthright about the extent of industry influ-
ence on their testimony.250 Second, mandatory disclosure of industry influence 
would lengthen the already arduous discovery process.251 These are not rea-
sons to abandon mandatory disclosure entirely.252 With respect to the first 
drawback, concealing industry influence already violates principles of scien-
tific integrity and risks lasting reputational damage.253 With respect to the sec-
ond, the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not solely to facili-
tate speedy disposition but also to ensure just determination.254 Because liti-
gants already evaluate potential experts in myriad other ways, the benefits of 
mandatory disclosure outweigh its burdens.255 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of industry-influenced evidence arises at the intersection 
of scientific and legal epistemology. Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejec-
tion of such evidence, many courts have failed even to recognize its dangers. 
The courts that have recognized industry influence have treated it as a matter 
of weight rather than admissibility. This has allowed industry-influenced evi-
dence to evade meaningful applications of the Frye, Daubert I, and Daubert 
II standards. This practice ignores the risks posed by the admission of indus-
                                                                                                                           
 248 See Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1317 (“[F]ew experts appear in court merely as an eleemosynary 
gesture.”); Patterson, supra note 95, at 1329 (“One cannot use the mere fact that an expert is paid by 
his client as a basis for inferring that his testimony is biased; one must look more carefully at the ex-
pert’s testimony to determine if it is biased, and once one makes that further inquiry, one is not relying 
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 249 See infra notes 250–255 and accompanying text. 
 250 See Patterson, supra note 95, at 1375–76 (proposing court-ordered disclosure of industry in-
fluence). The likelihood of incomplete disclosure might decrease with a uniform adoption of mandato-
ry disclosure through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than through a court-by-court or 
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closure based on existing regulatory and journalistic standards). 
 251 See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (2018) (recognizing the burdens of discovery and requiring each U.S. 
District Court to develop a plan to alleviate them); Patterson, supra note 95, at 1378 (“Requiring dis-
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 252 See infra notes 253–255 and accompanying text. 
 253 See, e.g., Basic Information About Scientific Integrity, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/osa/basic-information-about-scientific-integrity [https://perma.cc/ANM6-BQ8Y] 
(explaining the importance of scientific integrity). 
 254 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be “construed, 
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding”). 
 255 See Peter L. Winik, Strategies in Expert Depositions, 24 LITIG. 14, 16–17 (1998) (explaining 
the process of “sizing up” expert witnesses before trial). 
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try-influenced evidence, which in rare cases could amount to evidentiary 
fraud warranting dismissal. In most cases, however, only meaningful admis-
sibility reviews are necessary. These reviews should entertain arguments re-
garding the effect of the industry influence on the fair resolution of the case. 
Without mandatory disclosure to flag such influence, however, courts may 
very well turn a blind eye to the admission of potentially unreliable evidence. 
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